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Abstract 
 
This Senior Project advances the immigrant integration debate, examining the effect of labor 
market immigrant integration policies on the European labor force. Building on an existing body 
of literature that examines the migration and immigrant integration debate, this paper assesses 
the relationship between immigrant integration policies in the EU and the employment rate of the 
total, non-EU, low-skilled, young, old, and female labour force, by using panel data at the EU 
level to answer the question, “Can the labor market integration of immigrants lead to positive 
labor market outcomes as expressed by the employment rate?”. The relationship between labor 
market immigrant integration policies and the employment rate, was studied both at an EU level 
and at an individual country level. In order to examine the disparities that exist between the labor 
market immigrant integration policies and labor market outcomes, a country analysis for Austria, 
France, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, and the UK was done. On the EU level, a statistically 
significant positive correlation was found between the total, old, and female population and labor 
market immigrant integration policies. For the non-EU, low-skilled, and young labor force 
positive results were found but with no statistical significance. On the country level, the results 
were also mixed. These results were not well explained by the stated hypothesis that immigrant 
integration policies will lead to positive labor market outcomes as measured by the employment 
rate.  
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Introduction 
 In today’s increasingly globalized world, migration will always constitute an integral 
part. Migration has been increasing all over the world and in Europe. In the European Union, 
migration is a result of the increased mobility of people across member states, but also the 
growing number of immigrants from outside the EU. While migration is increasing, there has 
been extensive academic literature about its effect on the labour market. These academic debates 
have been accompanied by political debates on whether and how many immigrants states should 
allow in their territories. Most recently, the political debates have evolved around what to do 
with immigrants already within states. Europe has increasingly been challenged to integrate not 
only EU-nationals but also third-country nationals. A reality that has modified the understanding 
of what integration initially meant. The European Union has been aiming towards a collective 
response to migration and immigrant integration with respect to immigrants’ rights based on the 
international human rights framework. Nevertheless, member states still perceive migration and 
immigrant integration policies to be at the heart of national sovereignty. 
 Based on the EU framework, member states should be responsible to ensure labour 
market mobility, family reunion, education, political participation, permanent residency, 
nationality, anti-discrimination, and health for immigrants.1,2 Employment is a core element of 
the immigrant integration process and the EU has urged countries to focus on the promotion of 
the labour market integration of third-country nationals. 3  These conditions will allow for 
immigrants’ successful integration and thus their successful contribution to society and the 
                                                 
1 IOM, “World Migration Report 2015”, 2015. 
2 Migrant Integration Policy Index 2015, http://www.mipex.eu/ 
3 European Commission, “Action Plan of the Integration of Third Country Nationals”, 2016. 
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development of their destination countries.4 Nevertheless, member states have been enacting 
different policies and laws not necessarily following EU’s aim towards a collective EU response 
to migration and immigrant integration policies. These different approaches are linked to the 
academic debates around the merits of multiculturalism or assimilation.   
 Starting in the 1970s, European countries realized the increased prevalence of immigrants 
and discussions emerged about how to deal with this consistently disadvantaged portion of the 
population. The predominant response at that time was multiculturalism. However, after the turn 
of the century, politicians and academics started to challenge the effectiveness of 
multiculturalism. 5 , 6  Countries started implementing stricter migration policies and more 
demanding immigrant integration requirements including the knowledge of the host society’s 
language, history, and institutions.7 Different EU countries have been associated with different 
integration “models” in relation to their approaches to immigrant integration. For example, 
France8 has been the prototype of assimilationist integration policies. The Netherlands and the 
UK are countries perceived as the prototypes of the multiculturalist integration approach. 
However, countries’ approaches to integration have been changing. The Netherlands and the 
UK9 has increasingly been disinvesting in immigrant integration policies. On the other hand, 
countries like Germany10  and Austria11 , which had no immigrant integration policies, have 
                                                 
4 UNDP, “Overcoming barriers: Human mobility and development” Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. 
5 Weaver, “Angela Merkel: German Multiculturalism Has ‘Utterly Failed,’” The Guardian, 2010. 
6 Burns, “Cameron Criticizes ‘Multiculturalism’ in Britain,” The New York Times, 2011. 
7 Joppke, “Beyond national models: Civic integration policies for immigrants in Western Europe”, Western 
European Policies, Vol. 30, 2007. 
8 Entzinger & Biezeveld, “Benchmarking in Immigrant Integration”, European Research Centre on Migration and 
Ethnic Relations, 2003. 
9  Joppke, “Beyond national models: Civic integration policies for immigrants in Western Europe”, Western 
European Policies, Vol. 30, 2007. 
10 Bendel, “Coordinating Immigrant Integration in Germany: Mainstreaming at the Federal and Local Levels” 
Migration Policy Institute Europe, 2014. 
11 Kraler & Jandl, “Austria: A Country of Immigration?”, Migration Policy Institute, 2003. 
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created immigrant integration policies and have increasingly invested in targeted support 
programs. Importantly, the immigrant integration debate is still ongoing.  
 Overall, the literature around the immigration and integration of immigrants has been 
extensive. In the European Union, integration policies in relation to third-country nationals 
started in 1999. Since then, there has been a lot of normative developments and policy changes 
that are connected to the literature around integration. There has been a lot of academic debate 
about how immigrant integration works, the efficacy of certain approaches to immigrant 
integration, and whether or not European integration policies are converging. However, there has 
been limited quantitative analysis on the effectiveness of immigrant integration policies. On the 
policy level, the European Union has commissioned some researchers in order to find the best 
indicators that determine the success of immigrant integration and the factors that determine the 
immigrant integration outcomes. The Migrant Integration Policy Index is the most effective tool 
yet developed.  
 This Senior Thesis attempts to address the following question, “Can the labor market 
integration of immigrants lead to positive labor market outcomes as expressed by the 
employment rate?”. The operating hypothesis is that there is a positive correlation between 
labour market immigrant integration and the employment rate of the total population and 
different subgroups. To provide a quantitative answer to the research question, this paper uses 
panel data for 17 EU countries over the time period 2007-2014. An individual country analysis 
of Austria, Germany, France, Sweden, Netherlands, and the UK – countries that have been at the 
center of the immigrant integration debate – will allow to further examine the disparities that 
exist between labour market immigrant integration policies and outcomes.  
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 Finally, this paper concludes with recommendations on how to substantiate the academic 
and political debates around immigrant integration. Further questions are posed that the 
European Union and its member states should examine in order to increase the importance of 
immigrant integration in today’s globalized world, without which the full potential of immigrants 
will never be used. Failure to enable immigrants’ potential would be a massive waste of 
resources, both at the individual level and more generally for the European economy and society 
as a whole. 
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Chapter One: Economics of Migration 
1.1 Introduction 
 In an increasingly globalized world, migration is unavoidably an integral part. Migration 
has substantially increased all over the world and in Europe. In the European Union, increased 
migration is a result of the increased mobility across Member States, but also the growing 
inflows of immigrants from outside the EU. With migration being such an important part of 
today’s world, it is really important that migration policies facilitate the successful contribution 
of immigrants. According to UNDP’s Human Development Report, immigrant’s successful 
integration is directly related to their positive contribution to society and development.12 In order 
to facilitate the successful contribution of immigrants, policies should be coordinated at the 
national level while adhering to international human rights standards. EU law and developing 
norms call on member states to implement migration policies that ensure labor market mobility, 
family reunion, education, political participation, permanent residency, nationality, anti-
discrimination, and health for immigrants.13,14 Such conditions will help immigrants to be active 
participants in the development of their destination countries. 
 While migration is increasing, the debates around its effect on the labor market have been 
extensive. Most theorists conclude on the overall positive effects of migration on the labor 
market. In relation to the impact of migration on the wages and employment of native workers, 
the literature has also shown that there has not been a negative impact. Recently, the literature 
has developed arguing for immigrants’ positive contribution to society and development with 
their successful integration. However, there has been limited economic research examining how 
the integration of immigrants will specifically affect the wages and employment of native 
                                                 
12 UNDP, “Overcoming barriers: Human mobility and development” Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. 
13 IOM, “World Migration Report 2015”, 2015. 
14 Migrant Integration Policy Index 2015, http://www.mipex.eu/ 
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workers. Based on the migration literature, I support that immigrant integration will lead to 
positive effects on the employment and wages of native workers.  
 In this chapter I will first look at the trends of migration. I will move forward to examine 
Ruhs’ four economic effects of migration substantiating my stance with research on the impact 
of migration showing a positive result. Then I will explore the impact of migration on the wages 
and employment of native workers following the trajectory of the migration debate from 1989 
until today. After showing that immigrants do not have a negative effect on the employment and 
wages of native workers, I will argue that their effective integration will lead to apparent positive 
results at the national level as it will complementary respond to the labour market. I will do so 
connecting the migration literature to immigrant integration. Finally, I will recommend 
integration as an effective policy towards the heated migration debate.  
 
1.2 Migration Trends  
 It is crucial to depict the extent to which recent trends have contributed to the scope and 
complexity of migration. The accurate depiction of migration trends will allow for more clarity 
in relation to the principles governing international cooperation of migration and national 
capacities to manage it. Most states are now simultaneously countries of origin, transit, and 
destination for immigrants.15 Thus, states need to incorporate more comprehensive and inclusive 
migration policies diverging from the traditional, one-dimensional policies that were once in 
place.  
                                                 
15 OECD, “International Migration Outlook 2016”, 2016. 
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 According to Papademetriou16, large urban areas tend to attract the largest number of 
immigrants. Given that most immigrants live in urban areas and that most population growth is 
forecasted in cities and urban areas, local authorities will continue to play a crucial role in 
migration governance. According to EU law and developing norms, member states and local 
authorities are called to implement migration policies that will successfully integrate immigrants. 
Local authorities will increasingly be responsible to ensure labor market mobility, family 
reunion, education, political participation, permanent residency, nationality, anti-discrimination, 
and health for immigrants.17,18 Such conditions will help in the integration of immigrants and 
allow them to be active participants in the development of their destination countries.   
 Worldwide, the number of international migrants has grown rapidly reaching 244 million 
in 2015. The number of migrants is up from 222 million in 2010 and 173 million in 2000. 1/3 of 
all international migrants live in Europe. The stock of migrants is evenly divided between the 
two genders with women accounting for 48 percent of the total.19 One third of all international 
immigrants are estimated to be under the age of thirty. Also, more than 150 million are estimated 
to be immigrant workers.20 Migration has a positive impact on social, cultural, and economic 
benefits. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development adopted by the United Nations in 2015, 
recognizes the positive effects on inclusive growth and sustainable development in countries of 
origin, transit and destination.21 
                                                 
16 Papademetriou, “Fostering an Inclusive Identity Where It Matters Most: At the Local Level” Migration Policy 
Institute, 2014. 
17 IOM, “World Migration Report 2015”, 2015. 
18 MIPEX integration indicators  
19 United Nations, “International Migration Report 2015: Highlights”, Department of Economic & Social Affairs, 
Population Division, 2016. 
20 ILO, “Global estimates of migrant workers”, 2015. 
21 United Nations, “Transforming our World: 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development”, 2015. 
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 According to Geddes and Hadj-Adbou22, in 2012, there were 34.3 million foreign citizens 
living in the EU, accounting for 6.8 percent of the total European population. Of those, 13.6 
million were citizens of another EU member state (2.7 percent of the total EU population), while 
20.7 were third-country nationals (4.1 percent of the total EU population). The labour market 
participation of immigrants that were citizens of another EU member state was higher than 
nationals at 67.7 percent compared to 64.4 percent. Third-country national’s (TCN) labour 
market participation was lower at 53.7 percent.   
 
                                                 
22 Geddes and Hadj-Adbou, “An unstable equilibrium: freedom of movement and the welfare state in the European 
Union”, Handbook on Migration and Social Policy edt. By Freeman & Mirilovic, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016, 
p. 227. 
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 Figure 1.1 shows, the balance between citizens of another EU member state and TCNs in 
EU member states. According to the figure, in 2013, only eight countries -Luxembourg, Ireland, 
Slovakia, Belgium, Cyprus, Hungary, the Netherlands, and Malta- out of the 27-EU countries 
had more citizens of another EU member state as their immigrant population compared to TCNs. 
This figure could be viewed as evidence that non-EU immigrants are playing an increasingly 
major role in the EU. However, TCNs employment rates are lower than both EU nationals & 
EU-immigrants, which calls for more effective immigration policies that will ensure immigrants’ 
successful integration in the labor market. 
 
1.3 Ruhs’ Four Economic Effects of Migration   
 According to Ruhs23, there are four economic effects of migration on the receiving states 
that are most frequently discussed. First, the migration of workers whose skills and other factor 
endowments are, on average, different than those from the national population can create 
production complementarities increasing the national and average incomes among the resident 
population of the host country. A study from 1980-2005 in the OECD counties found that 
immigrants were complements rather than substitutes to the native workforce.24,25 Generally, 
migration has little effect on the wages and employment of native workers.26 It might suppress 
wages and employment opportunities for low-skilled native-born workers and earlier 
immigrants, in the short-run, if new immigrants become substitutes for similarly low-skilled 
workers. However, the evidence suggests that the impact is small and, on average, essentially 
                                                 
23 Ruhs, “Theorizing labor immigration policies: openness, skills and rights”, Handbook on Migration and Social 
Policy edt. By Freeman & Mirilovic, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016, p.442. 
24 Ortega and Peri, “The causes and effects of international labor mobility: evidence from OECD countries 1980-
2005”, United Nations Development Programme Human Development Research, 2009.  
25 Foged and Peri, “Immigrants’ effect on native workers: new analysis on longitudinal data”, Institute for the Study 
of Labour, 2015. 
26 Peri, “Do immigrant workers depress the wages of native workers?”, IZA World of Labor, 2014.  
  
10 
zero.27 Importantly, immigrants’ successful integration will unlikely have such effects as it will 
allow for their successful skill use and will complementary respond to labor market demands.  
 Second, immigrant workers can play a role in responding to labor and skill shortages in 
specific sectors and/or occupations. According to the World Bank, migration brings immediate 
increases in the labour supply facilitating many countries’ shortages at both the high and low 
ends of the skill spectrum.28  It is expected that, without immigration, the EU population will 
decline by 57 million people by the year of 2050.29 This expectation is created by increasing life 
expectancy in combination with low birth rates in Europe. However, the population of North 
Africa, the Middle East and Central Asia –Europe’s neighboring countries – is characterized by 
the increasing number of young individuals.30 Currently, it is estimated that the proportion of 
TCNs living in Europe is 4.1 percent of the total population.31 According to a report by the 
United Nations, European economies will need 700 million immigrants for the next 50 years to 
sustain growth and support their social security systems.32 Thus, migration could be the remedy 
of the aging European population with young individuals entering the EU from neighboring 
countries. 
 Third, migration could generate spillover effects resulting from a bigger economy (higher 
GDP), a more diverse society, a great share of highly skilled and motivated individuals, and a 
higher population density among others. Interestingly, spillover effects could be both positive 
and negative. Positively, most immigrants are relative young thus are actively participating in the 
                                                 
27 Peri, “Do immigrant workers depress the wages of native workers?”, IZA World of Labor, 2014, p.1. 
28 World Bank “Migration and Development: A Role for the World Bank Group”, 2016. 
29 United Nations, “Replacement Migration: Is It a Solution to Declining and Ageing Populations?” Population 
Division, Economic and Social Affairs, 2000. 
30 Munz, “Old Europe: A Look Ahead to the Twenty-First Century”, Institute for Human Sciences, 2007. 
31 OECD, “Indicators of Immigrant Integration 2015”, 2015. 
32 United Nations, “Replacement Migration: Is It a Solution to Declining and Ageing Populations?”, Population 
Division, Economic and Social Affairs, 2000. 
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workforce contributing to the gross domestic product (GDP).33 Increasing domestic demand for 
goods and services, immigrants also create jobs. Between 2000 and 2007, immigrants in the 
United States contributed to 32 per cent of GDP growth.34Immigrants also actively contribute in 
the creation of new jobs through their entrepreneurial spirit. From 1998 to 2008, foreign-born, 
self-employed owners of small and medium-sized firms created on average 1.4 to 2.1 additional 
jobs. 35  Additionally, immigrants play a great role in innovation especially in the fields of 
technology, engineering, and mathematics. Since 1975, 91 per cent of the patents in the United 
States were registered by inventors of Chinese, Indian, and European decent.36 Immigrants play a 
key role in the most dynamic sectors of the economy. New immigrants represent 22% of entries 
into expanding occupation in the US while 15% in the EU.37 Overall, recent evidence shows that 
immigrants are likely to boost firm productivity and the wages of native workers, in the long-run, 
stimulating firm growth and contributing to a range of skills and ideas.38  
 Forth, immigrants could be a burden or a boost for the welfare state and public finances 
depending on the difference between the taxes they pay and the costs of public services and 
benefits they consume. According to the “International Migration Outlook 2013” of the OECD, 
international immigrants contribute more on direct and indirect taxes than they receive on social 
benefits.39  
                                                 
33 OECD, ILO, World Bank. “The Contributions of Labor Mobility to Economic Growth.” Joint paper for G20 
Labour and Employment Ministers’ Meeting, 2015. 
34 Puente et al., “Towards an assessment of migration, development and human rights links: conceptual framework 
and new strategic indicators”, Peoples’ Global Action on Migration, Development, and Human Rights, IV Global 
Forum, 2010. 
35 OECD, “International Migration Outlook 2011”, 2011. 
36 Kerr, “U.S. high-skilled immigration, innovation, and entrepreneurship: empirical approaches and evidence”, 
World Intellectual Property Organization, 2013. 
37 OECD, ILO, World Bank. “The Contributions of Labor Mobility to Economic Growth.” Joint paper for G20 
Labour and Employment Ministers’ Meeting, 2015. 
38 Peri, “Do immigrants depress the wages of native workers?”, IZA World of Labor, 2014, p.1. 
39 OECD, “International Migration Outlook 2013”, 2013. 
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 All of the aforementioned evidence, responding to Ruhs’ four economic effects of 
migration on the receiving countries, suggests that immigrants are unlikely to hurt the host 
country and more importantly they benefit it. Increasingly though, the migration debate is fueled 
by biased data and inaccurate information stressing the challenges of migration, while 
downplaying the positive effects especially in the long term. This negative stereotyping creates 
xenophobic and racist sentiments. According to the European Barometer Survey of Spring 
2015 40 , more than half of the European population had a negative feeling towards the 
immigration of people from outside the European Union. A large number of natives feel 
threatened by immigrants and hold negative attitudes towards them and migration. 41  These 
hostile attitudes are also depicted through the rise of extremist parties in numerous European 
countries.42 Also, studies in some European countries show that migrant job candidates face 
increasing discrimination in their access to employment.43 
 The words “migrant” and “refugee” are irregularly distinguished and many times 
conflated in political discourse. 44  Refugees are established by international conventions as 
involuntary displaced individuals by political circumstances, whereas immigrants are seen as 
individuals voluntarily leaving their countries for better economic opportunities. Such views 
many times lead to perceive immigrants as unworthy of social, economic and political rights as 
they are perceived to have made a choice. Nevertheless, such distinctions do not always 
accurately reflect the causes of immigration. Many times, individuals are pushed to leave their 
                                                 
40 European Standard Eurobarometer Survey 83, 2015, p.36. 
41 Billiet, Meuleman, & Witte, “The Relationship Between Ethnic Threat and Economic Insecurity in Times of 
Economic Crisis: Analysis of European Social Survey Data”, Migration Studies, 2014.  
42 Halikiopoulou & Vlandas, “The Rise of The Far Right in Debtor and Creditor European Countries: The Case of 
European Parliament Elections”, The Political Quarterly, 2015. 
43 Simeone, Taran & Gächter, “‘Situation-Testing’: Discrimination in Access to Employment based on ILO 
Methodology”, International Migration Programme, 2010, p. 4. 
44 Holmes & Castaneda, “Representing “the European refugee crisis” in Germany and beyond: Deservingness and 
difference, life and death” Journal of the American Ethnological Society, 2016. 
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countries by economic circumstances that are politically produced; “Voluntary” economic 
immigrants leave their countries due to structural violence and post-colonial economic 
inequalities.45,46 
 In an increasingly globalized world, where migration is an integral part, it is important to 
accurately reflect the migration impact and its positive effects. Migration mostly results from the 
demand and supply conditions in the labor markets of both the origin and the destination 
countries. Immigrants fill labour and skill gaps 47 , transfer remittances, contribute to social 
protection systems, taxes, innovation and entrepreneurship, promote trade and investment and 
transfer technology, skills and knowledge. In relation to economic development, immigrants’ 
greatest contribution comes when they are well integrated, and their skills are properly used 
according to the host country’s needs.  
  In order to facilitate the successful contribution of immigrants, policies should be 
coordinated at the national level and should be based on international human rights standards. A 
lack of the protection of immigrants’ rights could lead to their exclusion and exploitation. 
Importantly, the protection of immigrants could benefit national workers by preventing a race to 
the bottom in relation to immigrants’ pay and working conditions. As Ruhs48 rightly explains, 
differential rights between immigrants and the native population could have negative effects. 
This stems from the fact that some employment-related rights can be costly for employers. All 
else being equal, employers will prefer immigrant workers under restricted rights than resident 
workers with full employment rights. The differential of the wage and employment conditions 
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between natives and nationals could lead to a complete segmentation of the labour market. 
Consequently, equality in pay and work-related rights vis-à-vis labour market immigrant 
integration could help avoid such negative consequences. 
 Overall, migration and development-related policies should be based on accurate 
information in contrast to misconceptions portraying immigrants as job-stealers or burdens. As, 
in fact, international migration contributes both directly and indirectly to the economic growth of 
host countries. Crucially though, the benefits of migration largely depend on the respect and 
upholding of immigrants’ rights based on the international human rights framework. In the 
European framework, the migration ‘governance’ model, although sometimes prevented by 
national interests, emphasizes its support for the migration of TCNs as labor needed for the 
economic development of the European Union.49 Additionally, the integration of immigrants is 
seen as an important step towards their inclusion to society. Consequently, the EU has aimed at 
the development of a common EU framework on the integration of TCNs as part of the Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice. The integration of third-country nationals has been incorporated 
in migration management aiming to secure access to rights, security, and social inclusion in 
third-country nationals. Labor market immigrant integration is given increasing importance in 
EU decisions seen as a “key part of the integration process” 50 making immigrants’ contributions 
to society visible.  
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1.4 Migration Literature  
 In this section, I would like to explore the impact of migration on the wages and 
employment of native workers. In order to do so, I will follow the trajectory of the migration 
debate on their impact to the native population from 1989 until today. I will analyze the 
perspectives of George Borjas, David Card, Giovanni Peri et al., Michael Clemens and Jennifer 
Hunt, and David Roodman.  My aim is to challenge Borjas’ perceptive that immigrants 
negatively affect the wages and employment of native workers supporting my claims with 
evidence provided by Card, Peri et al., Clemens & Hunt, and Roodman.  
 In 1989, Borjas developed a theory for international migration based on the neoclassical 
model of demand and supply. As he stated economics studies the allocation of scarce resources 
and “labor is a scarce resource that may be “allocated” to different labor markets.”51 People will 
migrate to maximize their utility (income-maximization hypothesis) and thus people will be 
“traded” across boundaries in the “immigration market” similarly with goods traded across 
boundaries in the international goods market.52 Individuals’ decisions to migrate will depend on 
the individuals’ financial resources, the immigration regulations imposed by competing host 
countries and the emigration regulations of the source country.53 According to Borjas’ theory, 
individuals with higher earning capacities will find it more expensive to migrate.54 
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 On the effect on wages, Borjas stated that immigrant wages will decrease based on the 
principle of diminishing marginal productivity. As more immigrants enter the labor market, their 
supply will increase, and their marginal productivity will decline lowering their wages. In 
relation to natives, if natives and immigrants are substitutes (Graph 1), the equilibrium wage 
(WW’) and employment (QQ’) of natives will decline as their labor demand will fall (point 
C). Thus, if natives and immigrants are substitutes, competition between them will lead to 
negative results in the labour market. On the other hand, if natives and immigrants are 
complements (Graph 2), natives will benefit from the entry of immigrants in the labor market 
increasing both their wages (WW’) and employment (QQ’). Natives and immigrants will 
complement each other increasing the overall labor demand (LdLd’). Empirical evidence at 
that time, suggested that immigrants’ effect on natives’ wages was negative but minimal. On the 
other hand, immigrants’ effect on immigrant wages was significant.55   
 In 1990, Card56 tested Borjas’ theory by looking at the large inflow of Cuban immigrants 
in the Miami labor market that happened in 1980. According to the data available, 50% of the 
Mariel immigrants settled permanently in Miami.57 This specific event was a perfect instance to 
examine the effect that low-skilled immigrants have on the wages and employment of native 
workers. It was an ideal “natural experiment”; a large, sudden wave of immigrants entering the 
Miami labor market, which allowed to test the economic theory in practice.  
 Card found that immigrants increased the Miami labor force by 7% and importantly 
increased the labor supply of low-skilled workers even more because most of the immigrants 
were relatively unskilled. However, the inflow of Mariel immigrants had no effect on the wages 
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56 Card, “The Impact of the Mariel Boatlift on the Miami Labor Market”, Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 
Vol. 43, No.2, 1990. 
57 Ibid, p.246. 
  
17 
and unemployment rates of low-skilled workers. Mariel immigrants effected the wages of neither 
non-Cuban workers nor other Cubans. Interestingly, the data suggests that a remarkably rapid 
absorption of the Mariel immigrants into the Miami labor force happened.58 
 According to Card this happened for two reasons. First, individuals respond to expected 
labor market opportunities thus they migrate to labour markets that could absorb them. 
Specifically, Cuban immigrants migrated to Miami because the structure of Miami’s industry 
was able to absorb them as it was in need of low-skilled labor. Miami’s high concentration of 
textile and apparel industries allowed Mariel immigrants to take unskilled jobs that earlier Cuban 
immigrants did not want anymore.  Also, the high concentration of Hispanics in Miami, allowed 
non-English speaking Mariel immigrants to be easily absorbed in the labour market as the role of 
language played a smaller effect. At the same time, native workers affected by the inflow of 
immigrants could have migrated to places where there was an increasing labor demand offsetting 
the negative effects of migration. Like Mariel immigrants migrated to Miami, other individuals 
could have migrated elsewhere leading to an overall positive labor market equilibrium. In a 
nutshell, Card suggests that the labour market is dynamic responding to changes and not static as 
Borjas and the neoclassical model is implying.  
 In 2003, Borjas59  revisited the impact of immigration on the labour market.  Borjas 
agreed with Samuelson’s assertion that in the textbook-model of a competitive labour market, an 
immigrant influx will lead to lower wages for competing factors. 60  Borjas criticized the 
geographic-dispersion-approach arguing that “the local labour market can adjust in far too many 
ways to provide a reasonable analogue to the “closed market” economy that underlies the 
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textbook supply-and-demand framework.”61 He also criticized the factor-proportions-approach 
arguing that it is too general, and it does not examine how certain shocks disproportionately 
affect some workers in relation to others. Overall, Borjas supported that studies like the Mariel 
Boatlift imply that the more firms and workers adjust to the immigrant supply shock, the smaller 
the cross-region correlations will be – disregarding migrants’ actual effect on native workers.62 
 In this paper, Borjas assumed that both schooling and work experience play a role in 
defining a skill group.63 Thus, he assumed that similarly educated workers with different levels 
of experience are not perfect substitutes. Taking both variables into consideration, he found that 
immigration had an importantly negative impact on the labour market opportunities of native 
workers. Borjas looked at men between the ages of 16-64 and found that between 1980 and 
2000, the labour supply of working men increased by 11.0 percent, while the wage of native 
workers decreased by 3.2 percent. Importantly, he found that the wage impact was 
disproportionate with high school dropouts being the most affected with an 8.9 percent decrease.  
 It is interesting how Borjas mentioned in his conclusion that he ignored the potential 
benefits that immigrants will have in the host country. As he stated64,  
[the] analysis ignored the long-run capital adjustments induced by immigration, the role played by capital-skill 
complementarities, and the possibility that high-skill immigration is an important engine for endogenous 
technological change 
Thus, Borjas acknowledged that he is focused only on the short-run, negative (based on his 
findings) effects of low-skilled migration.  
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 In 2009, Peri and Sparber65 came to support the evidence provided by Card in 1990 with 
the development of a model focusing on specialization. Their evidence came in contrast with 
Borjas’ findings. As they argue if workers’ skills are differentiated only by educational 
attainment/skill level, and the production technology and productivity of each type of labor are 
given, then a large inflow of low-skilled migrants could be shown to have a negative effect on 
the wages of native workers. This comes in alignment with Borjas findings. However, it can be 
the case that workers with similar observable characteristics are imperfect substitutes.66 Migrants 
and natives with comparable educational attainment and experience tend to have different unique 
skills. According to Peri and Sparber, workers will eventually specialize on what is best for their 
abilities eliminating the effect on wages since immigrants and natives will become 
complements.   
Large inflows of less-educated immigrants may reduce wages paid to comparably-educated, native-born workers, 
However, if less educated foreign- and native-born workers specialize in different production tasks, because of 
different abilities, immigration will cause natives to reallocate their task supply, thereby reducing downward wage 
pressure.67  
 Empirical research at that time suggested that immigrant workers tend to specialize in 
manual labor tasks as they have imperfect language skills and physical skills similar to native-
born workers. Immigrants have a comparative advantage in manual labor tasks, and consequently 
natives will have a comparative advantage in jobs demanding higher communication skills. This 
will lead workers to specialize accordingly and become complements. The market will benefit 
from specialization as productivity will increase. Importantly, language-intensive jobs tend to 
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earn a comparatively higher wage in relation to manually intensive jobs. Also, the wage could be 
further increased by the increased aggregate supply of complementary manually intensive jobs. 
Productivity gains from specialization in addition to higher wages paid to communication skills 
will offset the adverse effect on the wages paid to native workers. Indeed, according to Peri & 
Sparber 68 , migration reduced average real wages of less-educated US-born workers by 0.3 
percent between 1990 and 2000. Without task specialization the impact would have been bigger 
at 1.2 percent.  
 In 2015, Borjas69 reassessed Card’s original data and supported that Card chose wrong 
comparisons leading to positive results. As he emphasized, the effect of migration on the wage 
structure largely depends on the difference between the skills of immigrants and natives.70 Borjas 
supported that at least 60 percent of the Mariel immigrants were high school dropouts while the 
group made over a quarter of the city’s workforce. Thus, Borjas replicated the results by looking 
at what happened to the pre-existing group of high school dropouts in Miami. In order to do so, 
he looked at the wage trends of non-Hispanic men; 55.1% of the non-Hispanic dropouts in 
Miami were black. According to this evidence, the key native-born population potentially 
affected by the Marielitos was the low-skilled African American workers. Borjas found that the 
wages of high school dropouts between 1977-1979 and 1981-1986 fell dramatically (10-30%) 
which was a very unusual event compared to the wage trends of other cities at that period of 
time.  He also supported that Card’s “placebo” group was wrong leading to a weaker measured 
impact of migration. Overall, Borjas’ paper emphasized on the evolution of measurements and 
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argued that reexamining old data with new ideas could reveal different trends that could alter our 
way of thinking.  
 The debate evolved when, in 2016, Peri and Yasenov71, replicated Card’s original data 
using different methods in comparison to Borjas. Peri and Yasenov also looked at high school 
dropouts but did not find any negative effects. They argued that Borjas used a really small 
sample which resulted in noise and measurement errors. Additionally, there were two important 
events at that period, which could have affected the wages and employment opportunities in the 
labor market. First, there was an increase in the minimum wage in 1981 and secondly, there was 
a recession in 1982; consequently, an accurate control is of outmost importance. Peri and 
Yasenov first replicated the results with a larger sample and also used new mechanisms that 
allowed for immigrant complementarity, technology, and efficiency adjustments going beyond 
the one-dimensional neoclassical model that Borjas consistently uses. Using evolved methods in 
comparison to the study by Card in 1990, Peri and Yasenov found no evidence of negative wage 
and employment effects. They rather found that the deviation of low-skilled wages in Miami post 
1979 was small, non-significant and positive. 
 Finally, in 2017 Clemens and Hunt72, brought additional support to Peri and Yasenov’s 
claim that the selection of narrow subgroups can lead to different results. They also stressed that 
specification choices in the use of instrumental variables can impact the results. They argued that 
Borjas’ small sample of non-Hispanic workers was affected by a large, simultaneous, and 
irrelevant increase of the share of blacks in the original survey data. Black Miamians at that time 
had considerably low wages negatively affecting the results. Clemens and Hunt substantiated 
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their evidence further by looking at refugee waves showing that the impact of immigration on 
average native-born workers is small, while the impact on low-skilled workers is not detrimental. 
Overall, they agreed with Borjas that the “reanalysis of prior results often advances social 
science”, but in doing so, they led to strikingly different conclusions. 
 
1.4.1 Current Debate 
 In this section, I will emphasize on the last findings that exist and more specifically on 
Clemens and Hunt’s (2017) paper in contrast to Borjas’ (2015) results. In his article,73 Roodman 
supports that Borjas’ results are weak evidence on immigrants’ negative effect on the wages and 
employment of natives, especially of the low-skilled workers. As Clements and Hunt highlight, 
the arrival of the Marielitos came at the same time as the Census Bureau increased its coverage 
of the black Miamians. Black Miamians had especially low wages, which was highlighted in 
Borjas study. I agree with Roodman’s position and will support my argument below.  
 First, Roodman looks at the wages of low-education workers in 1980 and finds that their 
wages do not seem to have fallen since the drop is not sudden or big. He emphasizes that one can 
interpret the results differently in relation to their prior and argues that Borjas finds such results 
since he is preoccupied to find negative effects of immigrants on natives in the labor market. 
“The Borjas data are compatible with the hypothesis that wages fell at a constant rate between 
1977 and 1986, with no break from trend in 1980 or any other year in that span.” Since no 
sudden drop is seen in 1980, the year that Mariel Boatlift immigrants entered the Miamian labor 
market, one cannot argue that Mariel boatlift immigrants were the ones that caused the fall in the 
wages of native workers. 
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 Secondly, Roodman argues that, as Clemens and Hunt highlighted, Borjas’ negative 
results stem from the fact that the Census Bureau incorporated the wages of more low-income 
blacks. The Census Bureau provides weights that can compensate for such changes, but as 
Clemens and Hunt showed, these weights do not correct for the under-coverage of black 
Miamians before 1980. Thus, Borjas’ negative long-term effects in wages is caused from the 
coverage of low-income blacks in both data sets further weakening Borjas’ evidence of a 
negative long-term impact.  
 Roodman re-emphasizes that Borjas’ sample size is really small. As Clemens explained 
in another article,74 Borjas left out 91 per cent of the low-skilled workers in Miami leaving him 
with a tiny sample of just 17 workers per year.  Last but not least, Roodman states that it is really 
valuable that researchers, like Borjas, are increasingly more transparent making their data and 
computer code available, as it allows for greater debate on issues such as the one I am examining 
on this chapter.  
 Overall, a long literature in labor economics has come to a consensus that immigrants’ 
effect on native workers’ wages and employment is small or zero. On the same line, as I have 
already stated, I support that immigrants do not have a negative effect on the wages and 
employment of native workers supporting my claims with evidence provided by Card, Peri et al., 
Yasenov, Clemens, Hunt, and Roodman. I perceive Borjas’ claims to be preoccupied and have 
supported my beliefs with evidence from various economists.  
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1.5 Migration Literature Applied to Immigrant Integration 
 Borjas (1989) 75  has stressed that migration might suppress wages and employment 
opportunities for low-skilled native-born workers and earlier immigrants if new immigrants 
become substitutes for similarly low-skilled workers. However, economic research has shown 
that migration has zero or positive effects on the wages and employment of native workers. 
Immigrant integration will boost these positive effects on the labor market as it will allow for the 
successful specialization of immigrants and will thus complementary respond to labor market 
demands. Specifically, economic integration aims to “develop a skilled workforce responding to 
labor market needs, promoting job quality and lifelong learning” 76 . Immigrants’ greatest 
contribution comes when they are well integrated, and their skills are properly used according to 
the host country’s needs. 
 According to Card (1990) 77 , immigrants will optimally choose destination countries 
where their skills are more highly demanded, and the labor market can absorb them effectively. 
Thus, in the EU, immigrants will migrate to countries where their skill-set is more highly 
demanded expecting to be employed at jobs where their skills match.  However, in the EU 
immigrants face a high over-qualification rate and thus a skill-job mismatch 78. The number of 
highly-educated migrants has increased rapidly in the past decade, but much of migrants’ 
potential is currently not used. In 2010/11, 10 million highly educated migrants were not 
employed in the OECD and a further 8 million were formally overqualified for their job79. Part 
of the economic integration policies in the EU is to ensure that there is successful match between 
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the skills of immigrants and their job.80 This will lead to immigrants positively responding to the 
needs of the economy and complementary responding to the labor market. 
Going back to the graph of the labour market, 
labour market immigrant integration will 
match the skills of immigrants with the needs 
of the economy resulting to migrants and 
natives being complements in the economy 
and thus higher wages (W  W’) and 
employment (Q  Q’). It is expected that the 
successful integration of migrants will lead to both short-run and long-run positive effects in the 
labor market as expressed in the wages and employment of native workers as its aim is to 
facilitate the positive effects of migration.  
 According to Peri & Sparber (2009) 81 , immigrants and natives with comparable 
educational attainment and experience tend to have unique skills making them imperfect 
substitutes. This will lead them to specialize on tasks that are best for their abilities eliminating 
the effect on wages since immigrants and natives will become complements. Peri and Sparber’s 
argument was based on empirical research at that time, which suggested that immigrants tend to 
specialize in manual labor tasks as they have imperfect language skills and physical skills similar 
to native-born workers. D’Amuri and Peri (2010) 82  analyzed the effect on immigration on 
natives’ job specialization in Western Europe and found that immigrants and natives tend to 
specialize in different production tasks. Specifically, the average native worker increasingly 
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specializes in more complex production tasks, while the average immigrant worker is 
increasingly specializing in more routine, manual jobs. However, immigrant workers’ 
specialization in more routine, manual jobs could also be seen as a result of the difficulties in 
transferring skills across borders.83 
 In recent years, foreign-born workers are increasingly concentrated in the service sector. 
Immigrants tend to be over-represented in the hotel and food services, in administrative and 
support service activities and in jobs where the employer is the household.84 These changes are 
happening as Europe as a whole is transforming from being a production economy to a service 
economy. We can see in the graph that the percentage change of the employment in the service 
sector from 2007 – 2014, has been increasing. In 2014, 71.05% of the total EU labor force was 
employed in the service sector.  
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 Additionally, the recent economic crisis affected the manufacturing, construction, and 
financial sector further reducing the share of such jobs provided in the labor market as a whole.85 
In the manufacturing sector, immigrants are under-represented in relation to natives in the 
majority of the EU countries. Based on OECD data86, the immigrant share of employment in the 
manufacturing sector declined in relative terms between 2000 and 2005-2006 in all OECD 
countries, while an increasing proportion of immigrants are employed in the service sector. 
 Based on the empirical research provided by Peri and Sparber one could argue that 
language acquisition through integration could lead to natives and immigrants becoming 
substitutes in the economy negatively affecting the wages and employment of native workers. 
Empirical research at that time suggested that immigrants tend to specialize in manual labor tasks 
as they have imperfect language skills and physical skills similar to native-born workers. 
However, based on current empirical evidence in Europe, language acquisition could be seen as 
an integral part for immigrants’ successful specialization to the service sector. Speaking the 
native language or other languages could help immigrants being more successful in the service 
sector. Having said that, language acquisition through the integration of migrants should not be 
seen a threat to the native workforce in the EU.  
 Also, language acquisition and labour market integration could lead to greater autonomy 
of migrants allowing them to participate in the labour market without the need of social 
networks. This effect could be expanded with integration policies as a whole where learning the 
culture and norms could lead to effective, independent participation in mainstream institutions. 
This way, market adjustment to migration would be faster and efficiency will be increased.   
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 The successful labour market integration of migrants will lead to equality in pay and 
work-related rights not allowing employers to choose immigrants instead of natives because they 
can pay them an inferior wage. A lack of the protection of immigrants’ rights could lead to their 
exclusion and exploitation. Importantly, the protection of immigrants could benefit national 
workers by preventing a race to the bottom in relation to immigrants’ pay and working 
conditions. This will thus not result in negative labour market consequences for natives.  
 Overall, immigrants contribute to the host countries’ economies complementary 
responding to labour market needs. However, the full potential of immigrants’ skills is not 
always efficiently used because of the ineffective transferability of skills. This could be caused 
because there is non-equivalence and/or non-recognition of qualifications, lack of language 
skills, or restricted access to specific occupations. 87  Effectively using the full potential of 
immigrants’ skills is an important challenge for the EU especially at a time when the EU is 
experiencing an increasingly ageing population and a growing demand for skills as their 
economies become more knowledge-based.88 Migration can only continue to have a positive 
impact in the economy and the labor market if immigrants are well-integrated and their skills are 
properly used.  
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1.6 Recommended Policy: Immigrant Integration 
 In an increasingly globalized world, where migration is an integral part, it is important to 
accurately reflect the migration impact and its positive effects. Importantly, immigrants’ positive 
contribution to society and development is directly related to their successful integration.89 Based 
on the international human rights framework, immigrants’ integration is part of their human 
rights. In the EU, law and developing norms call on member states to implement migration 
policies that will successfully integrate migrants into society. National authorities are called to be 
responsible to ensure labor market mobility, family reunion, education, political participation, 
permanent residency, nationality, anti-discrimination, and health for immigrants. 90 , 91  Such 
conditions will help immigrants to be active participants in the development of their destination 
countries and positively contribute to the economy.  
 Importantly though, migration ‘governance’ meaning the collection of national laws, 
policies, and practices, supported by an emerging international framework –both binding and 
non-binding– could vary across states. This is the case with the integration of immigrants where 
states regulate their own economic, social and cultural interests integrating immigrants 
analogously. Nevertheless, the conditions of the integration of immigrants should always be 
defined by the international human rights framework, including the protection of their economic, 
social and cultural rights.92 Migration can have a strong positive impact on the state’s economic, 
social and cultural development when immigrants are well-integrated accordingly. 
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 One should point out that an important challenge for migration governance is the 
existence of tension between the increasing international attention to migration and the growing 
national anti-migrant, xenophobic sentiments. This tension calls for the effective migration 
governance and international cooperation in order to alleviate the increasing hostility at the 
national level. After showing that immigrants do not have a negative effect on the employment 
and wages of native workers, I have argued that their effective integration will lead to apparent 
positive results at the national level and it will hopefully alleviate such tensions. 
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Chapter Two: European Immigrant Integration 
2.1 Introduction 
 Since the establishment of the European Union, integration has been at the core of EU 
policies. The European integration process in the EU started with the establishment of an internal 
market. 93  At that time, integration aimed to facilitate the mobility of EU-national migrant 
workers across the internal borders of member states, where they would enjoy equality, non-
discrimination, family reunification and secure judicial status.94  In the 1990s,95  the focus of 
integration shifted from EU-nationals to TCNs and since then the EU has aimed at the 
development of a common EU framework on the integration of TCNs as part of the Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice. 96  Integration has now been incorporated in migration 
management aiming to secure access to rights, security, and social inclusion to third-country 
nationals.97 As stated in the Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy in the 
European Union (CBP), which was one of the first & most important steps towards a common 
EU framework, immigrant integration is seen as a “dynamic, two-way process of mutual 
accommodation by all migrants & residents of member states”98. Thus, immigrant integration is 
seen as an active process that is facilitated by both immigrants and Member States. Overall, in 
today’s globalized world where people are moving around the world at an increasing rate, 
Europe has increasingly been challenged to integrate not only EU-nationals but also third-
country nationals; a reality that has modified the initial understanding of what integration meant 
to include.  
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 Globalization has increasingly altered the position and institutional features of the nation-
state. The model of post-national citizenship, as exemplified in the European Union, has been a 
response to the challenges of globalization. The model insists on the importance of the nation-
state and its sovereignty while at the same time it advocates for a form of membership that 
transcends the boundaries of the nation-state99. As Soysal argues100, rights and obligations are no 
longer defined based on nationality but on universal personhood. Immigrant integration is caught 
in this intersection, where the integration of migrants is seen as an integral part of their human 
rights, but member states still perceive migration and immigrant integration policies to be at the 
heart of national sovereignty.  
 Even if the EU has been aiming towards a collective response to migration and immigrant 
integration with respect to migrants’ human rights, member states still perceive migration and 
immigrant integration policies to be at the heart of national sovereignty. The European approach 
has been to encourage what is typically referred to as a ‘process of convergence’ among states 
with regards to immigrant integration. Thus, the European Union in its ‘process of convergence’ 
has been increasingly using non-legislative policy-making and soft-law governance 
techniques101. European immigrant integration is primarily based on “knowledge-sharing, policy 
coordination and the exchange of information.”102 Since 2004, the EU has taken important steps 
towards immigrant integration. A set of Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration 
Policy (CBPs)103, three Handbooks on Integration for Policy-makers and Practitioners104, three 
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Annual Report(s) on Migration and Integration105, the National Contact Points on Integration106, 
a European Web Site on Integration focusing on immigrant integration 107 , as well as the 
European Fund for Integration of third-country nationals (EIF)108 are among the steps that the 
EU has taken towards a collective response to immigrant integration.  
 The most positive step towards a collective response to the integration of TCNs was 
taken in 2016, with the Action Plan 109 . Stressing the increasing levels of discrimination, 
prejudice, racism and xenophobia in the last few years, the European Commission stated that it is 
Europe’s legal, moral and economic imperatives to uphold fundamental rights, values and 
freedoms. The European Commission concluded that the integration of immigrants is a common 
interest to all Member States and investing to immigrant integration policies will lead to positive 
long-run effects. The Action Plan highlighted that employment is a core element of the 
immigrant integration process and urged countries to focus their efforts on the promotion of 
labour market integration of third-country nationals. Importantly, it was not the first time that 
employment’s importance was emphasized. In the First Annual Report on Migration and 
Integration110, published in 2004, “access to employment” became “the most important political 
priority within national integration policies”. It also appeared in the Common Basic Principles, 
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the same year, as a “key part of the integration process”111 making immigrants’ contributions to 
society visible (CBP3). 
 However, the official EU stance on the direction of immigrant integration policies as a 
whole remains rather ambivalent. The CBPs, the “principles against which [Member States] can 
judge and assess their own [integration] efforts” allow room for a wide range of interpretation. 
This is a reflection of the complicated national histories of responding to minorities and new 
immigrants in different European states. Countries have a wide range of policies and underlying 
theories, but one of the principal areas of uncertainty has been how to address the questions of 
cultural diversity.  
 Starting in the 1970s, several European countries realized the increased prevalence of 
immigrants and discussions emerged about how to deal with this consistently disadvantaged 
portion of the population. In Europe, the predominant response around that time was 
multiculturalism. However, after the turn of the century, politicians and academics started to 
challenge the effectiveness of multiculturalism.112 ,113  Countries started implementing stricter 
migration policies and more demanding immigrant integration requirements including the 
knowledge of the host society’s language, history, and institutions (CBP4)114. On the other hand, 
some countries started taking more encouraging steps towards immigrant integration. Countries, 
like Germany and Austria, that had no immigrant integration policies before created immigrant 
integration policies and acknowledged their status as an immigration country.115 Nevertheless, 
this does not mean that the debate around immigrant integration is yet resolved.   
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 Overall, the literature around the immigration and integration of migrants has been 
extensive. Integration policies in relation to third-country nationals in the European Union 
started in 1999116. Since then, there have been a lot of normative developments and policy 
changes that are connected to the literature around integration. There has been a lot of academic 
debate about how immigrant integration works, the efficacy of certain approaches to immigrant 
integration, and whether or not European integration policies for migrants are converging. On the 
policy level, the European Union has commissioned some researchers in order to find the best 
indicators that determine the success of immigrant integration and the factors that determine the 
immigrant integration outcomes. The Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX)117 is the most 
effective tool that has been developed. It analyzes immigrant integration in eight policy areas - 
labour market mobility, education of children, political participation, family reunion, access to 
nationality, health, permanent residence and anti-discrimination –based on the highest European 
and international standards drawn from the Council of European Conventions, European Union 
Directives and international conventions. 
 
2.2. Academic Theories on Immigrant Integration 
 It is common to associate the idea of immigrant integration with that of a “model” 
categorizing each country according to a specific “pattern” when dealing with migration. 
Importantly, cultural, linguistic and religious diversity could be treated differently according to 
different political systems. Michael Walzer offers a classification of the political systems 
according to their approach to diversity. He defines five “political tolerance systems” in the 
West: multinational empires, international society, consociations, nation-states and immigration 
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societies.118 According to Walzer, these systems differ by their specific management of cultural, 
linguistic, and religious diversity laying the foundation of a certain mode of cohabitation. 
Categorizing the countries of the European Union based on Walzer’s classification system, we 
would argue that ‘nation-states’ is the prevailing model.  
 The nation-state means that “a single dominant group organizes life together according to 
its own history and culture.”119 In the European Union, each country has its own dominant ethnic 
group -majority- sharing a common history and culture. The State recognizes and accepts the 
existence of minorities in its territory, but its tolerance is limited not challenging the cultural and 
linguistic monopoly granted to the majority. This collective approach is directly related to 
integration. In nation-states, integration does not only involve migrants; it involves the entire 
population. According to Marcel Mauss, “there cannot be a nation without there being a certain 
integration of society”120, since by definition the nation is “a society materially and morally 
integrated, with a stable and permanent central authority, with determinate borders, whose 
inhabitants possess a relative moral, mental, and cultural unity and consciously adhere to the 
state and its laws”121 Thus, immigrant integration is inseparable from national integration as a 
whole explaining the link that is established between national identity and migration. Immigrants 
have to become integrated as it is expected from nationals serving to the definition both of the 
nation by Mauss and the nation-state by Walzer.  
 Mauss argues that integration is a consequence of ‘individualization’ writing that “a 
nation worthy of its name has its own civilization (aesthetic, moral, material) and almost always 
its own language. It has its own mentality, its own sensibility, its own morality, its own will, its 
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own form of progress”122.  Thus, ‘individualization’, as Brubaker123 rightly says in his analysis of 
Mauss’ theory, has a dual aspect. First, internal homogenization vis a vis integration, and 
secondly, external differentiation. Mauss further argues that migration accentuates this desire of 
the nation to maintain its individuality.124  However, as he later observes what we today call 
globalization has resulted in a “state of permeation and growing mutual dependency”125 leading 
to “mentalities of nations… more open than ever before to each other”.126 As Brubaker addresses 
this could lead to integration on a super-national scale and consequently to the de-
individualization of the nation.127 
 Globalization has increasingly altered the position and institutional features of the state. 
Globalization forces have destabilized the role of the state and more specifically that of the 
nation-state. The model of post-national citizenship comes as a response to the destabilization of 
national citizenship. One could argue that the model of post-national citizenship is exemplified in 
the European Union. Quoting Benhabib, “The European Union reproduces at the supranational 
level the internal tensions which have accompanied the birth of modern nation-states, while also 
showing their evolution along a different path.”128  The model insists on the importance of the 
nation-state and its sovereignty while at the same time it advocates for a form of membership 
that transcend the boundaries of the nation-state129. As Soysal argues130, rights and obligations 
are no longer defined based on nationality but on universal personhood. 
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 In the post-national citizenship model, citizenship moves away from nationhood to 
personhood.131 Rights are expanded beyond those reinforced by national attribute and are now 
extended to include individuals that were previously excluded. Post-national citizenship is a 
postwar phenomenon facilitated by the increasing flow of goods and people especially the labor 
migration that occurred after World War II. 132  The model moves away from fixed to fluid 
boundaries. However, this does not mean that the state has fluid boundaries.133 The nation still 
has the right to exclude. Importantly though, its right to exclude must be based on a firm 
explanation as humanitarian arguments for migration play greater importance. All nations are 
held accountable to the same human rights.  
 Based on the EU human rights framework, integration is seen as immigrants’ 
fundamental right.134 Here it is important to distinguish between the terms assimilation and 
integration. Assimilation means the total abandonment of one’s culture of origin.135 On the other 
hand, integration allows the attachment to one’s original culture while at the same time 
internalizing the behavioral standards of society136. Assimilation has been deemed as a negative 
way of incorporating minorities into society. Although “assimilation” has been banned from the 
official language, one should be careful and realize that the term “integration” which has 
replaced it still indicates a certain degree of acculturation. Nowadays, the Nation State expects 
migrants to learn the official language, respect the culture and values (CBP4) and many times 
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comply with the majority’s way of life.137        
  
2.2.1 Assimilation & Assimilationist Integration 
 Integration policies that follow the assimilationist perceptive claim blindness in relation 
to the cultural and religious differences that groups have.138 Based on the principle of equal 
dignity for all citizens, “assimilationist” integration policies are built on a universalist policy 
attributing the same rights to all, regardless of their cultural, linguistic and religious differences. 
Thus, “equality is guaranteed by rigorous identical treatment, independent of differences”139. But 
is the treatment identical? In the assimilationist perspective, it is expected that over time 
differences will disappear. Thus, even if the purpose of the assimilationist integration perspective 
is not the erasement of one’s culture, language and religion, in practice it could have the same 
result as to what assimilation used to mean in the 19th century.  
 Assimilation as a concept first appeared during the large immigration waves of the 
industrial-era in the late 19th century and was based on three assumptions. First, immigrants will 
come to share a common culture with the majority as they will be given the same socioeconomic 
opportunities. Secondly, the adoption of the majority’s culture will lead to the gradual 
disappearance of the migrants’ native culture. Finally, once the process has begun it is 
irreversible; it will inevitably lead to full assimilation.140Historically, the assimilationist approach 
was most prominently used throughout the United States to deal with the European migration 
waves prior to the 1970s.141 But there are also European examples.  
                                                 
137 Joppke, “Beyond national models: Civic integration policies for immigrants in Western Europe”, Western 
European Policies, Vol. 30, 2007, p.7. 
138Choquet, “Models of Integration in Europe” Fondation Robert Schuman, 2017. 
139 Ibid.  
140 Algan et al., “Cultural Integration of Immigrants in Europe”, Oxford University Press, 2012, p.4. 
141 Gordon, "Assimilation in America: Theory and Reality." The MIT Press on behalf of American Academy of Arts 
& Sciences 90.2, 1961. 
  
40 
 France is an example of the “assimilationist” integration approach in the European 
Union. In the French Jacobin tradition, what matters is the relationship between the individual 
and the state, without the interference of intermediaries. 142  Consequently, it should not be 
possible to acknowledge differences in culture or religion in the public sphere. Based on the 
notion of secularism, France passed a bill in 2004143 banning “the wearing of signs or clothes 
showing a religious affiliation in schools, colleges, and public high schools”. Although the law 
has been open to interpretation, it seems to be particularly targeting the veil and headscarf, 
religious symbols mostly connected to the Muslim religion. Small crosses were accepted in 
schools, which makes the policy rather questionable as crosses are mostly connected to the 
Christian tradition. France’s majority is Christian, while its biggest minority is Muslim. Thus, it 
is evident that France’s stance with this policy responded to the cultural majority expecting its 
minority groups to assimilate. 
 Importantly, theorists like Able and Nee, have noted that “assimilation has come to be 
viewed by social scientists as a worn-out theory, which imposed ethnocentric and patronizing 
demands on minority peoples struggling to retain their cultural and ethnic integrity.”144 Thus, 
assimilationist integration policies, the way they were practiced during the twentieth century, 
have attracted a lot of criticism Nevertheless, in recent years, an increasing number of European 
states expect migrants to learn the official language, respect the culture and values (CBP4) and 
many times comply with the majority’s way of life.145 
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2.2.2 Multiculturalism & Multiculturalist Integration 
 During the 1970s, the assimilationist rhetoric started to shift into a multicultural dialogue. 
The multiculturalist perceptive of integration is based on the policy of difference stressing that 
all citizens must have the right to live according to their culture and religion.146 Thus, the most 
important factor of this theory is its demand that “all groups should be recognized”147. This 
approach recognizes that universal laws adopted by the majority could be discriminatory for the 
minority since they are designed by the majority. As Will Kymlicka notes, “the state unavoidably 
promotes certain cultural identities, and thereby disadvantages others.”148 Thus, in order to treat 
individuals fairly, differential policies should be introduced to re-establish equality. 149 
Multiculturalism as an immigrant integration policy takes a step further and not only recognizes 
the right of other individuals to express their differences but also demands from the government 
to protect the minorities’ culture calling for varying degrees of proactive protection.150 
 In Europe, the “multiculturalist” approach is most commonly associated with the United 
Kingdom or the Netherlands.151 In the UK, the immigrant integration approach taken in the 
1970s is exemplified by Roy Jenkins (1967), the then Home Secretary. Integration did not mean 
immigrants losing their own features and national culture. I do not believe that we need a melting pot in this country, 
which would transform everyone in a common mould, like a sample from a series of carbon copies of the tactless 
vision that some might have of the British stereotype. I therefore define integration not like the levelling process of 
assimilation but as equal opportunities, associated with cultural diversity, in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance152  
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 However, starting in the 2000s a more secular and rather nationalistic approach was 
followed. Based on the Robert Schuman Fondation 153 , The Nationality, Immigration, and 
Asylum Act of 2002 in the UK put forward the symbolic strengthening of national identity. After 
the Act, people seeking nationality had to take a citizen’s test claiming their knowledge of the 
English language, the institutions, the history, and the law of Britain. Along the same lines, 
Netherlands’ integration policy of TCNs changed also in 2002 following the assassination of 
“iconic leader”154 Pim Fortuyn. In the Netherlands, the political elites aimed at achieving migrant 
participation in mainstream institutions, Dutch-language acquisition and labor market 
integration.155 Generally, countries, like the Netherlands and the UK, that were traditionally 
associated with the “multiculturalist” approach have altered their direction to integration towards 
a more secular and nationalistic approach.         
  
2.2.3 EU Stance 
 The official EU stance on the direction of immigrant integration policies remains rather 
ambivalent. More specifically this ambivalence comes in relation to cultural diversity reflecting 
the broader lack of consensus across Europe as analyzed above. This ambivalence is exemplified 
in the Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration; the guide that the European Union 
has created for Member States to judge and asses their immigrant integration efforts. More 
specifically, CBP8 states that “the practices of diverse cultures and religion as recognized under 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights must be guaranteed” and the Council Conclusions state that 
“full respect for the immigrants’ and their descendants’ own language and culture should be an 
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important element of integration policy”156. However, CBP8 also stresses that Member States 
should show “support for cultural and religious expressions that respect national and European 
values, rights and laws”.157 This shows that even if the CBPs urge Member States to respect the 
minorities’ culture, at the same time they stress that the respect should be limited not challenging 
the cultural and linguistic monopoly granted to the majority. 
 Member States also have a responsibility to ensure that cultural and religious practices do not prevent 
individual migrants from exercising other fundamental rights or from participating in the host society. This is 
particularly important as it pertains to the rights and equality of women, the rights and interests of children and the 
freedom to practice or not to practice a particular religion.158 
In the excerpt above, there is an emphasis on fundamental rights. However, one should not forget 
that rights are defined according to EU standards thus they reflect the majority’s notion of what 
rights mean. Additionally, without specifying what exactly is meant by fundamental rights, 
Member States are allowed to interpret such directives as they please. We see that in some cases 
Member States have implemented more demanding policies closer to acculturation or even 
assimilation.159  
 This stance is linked to the ‘failures of multiculturalism’. In 2010, it was argued by many 
politicians that multiculturalism had “utterly failed” as a European immigrant integration 
policy. 160  Throughout the year, Chancellor Merkel, Prime Minister Cameron, and President 
Sarkozy were all condemning multiculturalism. Cameron argued that multiculturalism “had 
failed to promote a sense of common identity centered on the values of human rights, democracy, 
social integration, and equality before the law.”161 Nevertheless, these policymakers were not the 
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first ones to criticize the multiculturalist integration perspectives that characterized many 
Western European countries. With the increase of “globalization” in the 1990s, many scholars 
viewed “contemporary immigration as obliterating and undermining some traditional principles 
of nation states.” 162  Overall, with increased migration, the multiculturalist perspective of 
immigrant integration was deemed ineffective undermining the common sense of European and 
national identity. 
 This lack of public consensus for multiculturalist policies could be associated with the 
increase in the support of populist right-wing parties throughout Europe. In many European 
countries like Austria, the Netherlands, and France, both in the 1990s and the 2010s, we see a big 
increase in the support of right-wing parties. Right-wing parties across Europe preach against 
globalization associating it with multiculturalism and overly liberal integration policies.163  
 The EU has suggested intercultural dialogue as a potential solution to the problem. The 
European Commission Handbook on Integration has urged that governments encourage 
intercultural and interreligious dialogue establishing dialogue platforms and providing financial 
assistance if necessary in order to create more open-minded and less skeptical societies.164 At the 
same time, the EU has focused on employment as an integral part for Nation-States’ immigrant 
integration efforts. This focus appeared in the first steps towards an EU collective response to 
migrant integration. In the First Annual Report on Migration and Integration and the Common 
Basic Principles “access to employment” has become “the most important political priority 
within national integration policies”165 perceived as a “key part to the integration process”166. In 
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2016, the emphasis on employment for successful immigrant integration was reaffirmed with the 
Action Plan167.            
  
2.2.4 Structuralism 
 Here it is important to stress that both assimilationist and multiculturalist theories on 
integration give a great emphasis on the agency of migrants. Nevertheless, as aforementioned, 
the structure of the society could play a crucial role in their integration. It is not only about the 
steps that immigrants will take towards their integration but also about how much the society is 
willing to accept them. The structuralist theory emphasizes that socio-economic opportunities 
available to migrants play an important role in their integration regardless of their individual 
efforts to integrate. Migrants’ unequal access to housing or jobs, could hinder their ability to 
integrate.168 As Portes and Borocz note, “the combination of different class origins and contexts 
of reception gives rise to a plurality of settlement patterns” and integration outcomes.169 
 Portes and Borocz analyze three types of ‘contexts of reception’. First, an 
overwhelmingly negative society in which the government takes a very adverse and restrictive 
stance towards immigration and tries to suppress the influx altogether. In this model, 
“immigrants are (also) negatively typified by employers, either as unsuitable labor or as suitable 
only for menial jobs, a condition compounded by generalized prejudice among the native 
population.”170 In such societal conditions immigrants are less likely to succeed. In a neutral 
society, the government neither encourages not discourages migration and no strong stereotypes 
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about migrants exist. Finally, in a positive society the government is positive about migration and 
not only permits it but supports it through legal and material assistance. 171  Consequently, 
depending on the ‘contexts of reception’ migrants’ integration could be hindered, not affected, or 
supported.  
 An additional factor affecting the integration of migrants is social class. Portes and 
Borocz divide immigrants in two categories: manual laborers and professionals. They argue that 
in a negative society both categories have a hard time to integrate. First, employers are less likely 
to hire migrants but also professionals face difficulties in acquiring the necessary licenses and 
revalidating titles. In a neutral society, professionals are more likely to be culturally integrated 
into society, as they can enter directly into their field. Manual laborers are still expected to face 
some difficulties. Finally, in favorable societies both types of migrants have higher chances to 
succeed since the government provides them with legal and material benefits.172 This shows that 
immigrants labor market integration and employment is largely depended on society. 
 Portes and Borocz stress the importance that the structure of the society plays in the 
integration of migrants. European institutions are very powerful, and they play a very important 
role in the acceptance of migrants into the society and even the labor market. Many times, it does 
not even matter how much immigrants will try and integrate, what matters is if the society is 
positive towards immigrants allowing for their successful integration. 
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2.3 Immigrant Integration Policies in the European Union 
 The European Union has realized that the integration of migrants can have positive 
benefits for the European development. If migrants are successfully integrated into the society, 
they can actively contribute to the economic, social, cultural and political development of 
European societies. The successful integration of immigrants into the host society can lead to the 
outmost gain of legal migration. Thus, failure to enable immigrants’ potential would be a 
massive waste of resources, both at the individual level and more generally for the European 
economy and society as a whole. 173  To this understanding, the European Union has been 
supporting national and local policies to promote policy coordination, exchange of knowledge 
and financial resources, even if Member States are the ones primarily responsible for integration.  
 The European Union cooperation on the integration of non- EU nationals started with the 
adoption of the Tampere Programme in 1999174 . The Tampere conclusions in 1999 by the 
European Council led to the adoption of two legally-binding Council Directives on the Right to 
Family Reunification 175  and the status of Third Country Nationals who are Long-term 
Residents176 in 2003. The Directive on Long-term Residents states that: 
The integration of third-country nationals who are long-term residents in the Member States is a key element in 
promoting economic and social cohesion [..and] in order to constitute a genuine instrument for the integration of 
long-term residents into the society in which they live, long-term residents should enjoy equality of treatment with 
citizens of the Member State in a wide range of economic and social matters. 
Thus, according to the directive a secure legal status and non-discrimination will allow for the 
successful integration of migrants. The legislation emphasizes on non-discrimination in the areas 
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of employment, equal working conditions, education and training, recognition of qualifications, 
social protection defined by national law, equal tax benefits, and equality of access to goods and 
services.177 In both of these directives, “integration conditions are seen as a necessary condition 
for the stability and social cohesion in European societies”.178  
 During the same time, two networks were created in order to support the development of 
the European integration policies. The first one was the National Contact Points on Integration in 
2002 that was later renamed as the European Integration Network in 2016 and has been 
responsible to shape the European migration integration agenda. The second, called the European 
Migration Network (EMN)179 created in 2003 was responsible for the provision of information to 
policymakers and citizens through reports and studies. Importantly, the first financial resource 
promoting integration measures came in 2003 with the Preparatory Actions for Integration of 
Third Country Nationals (INTI). The agenda included the promotion of local activities, as well as 
the strengthening of networks, exchange of information, and good practices between Member 
States, their regional and local authorities and other stakeholders.  
 The first steps towards a common immigrant integration policy among Member States 
came in 2004 with the adoption of the Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration 
Policy in the EU180 by the Justice and Home Affairs Council. This policy was adopted under the 
Hague Programme in 2004. The CBPs were described as a “simple non-binding but thoughtful 
guide of basic principles against which [Member States] can judge and assess their own 
[integration] efforts”181. Member States renewed their commitment to such principles in 2014, 
                                                 
177 Mulcahy, “Europe’s Migrant Policies: Illusions of Integration”, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, p.30. 
178 Ibid, p.31. 
179European Migration Network (EMN) https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-
do/networks/european_migration_network_en. 
180 European Commission, “Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy In The EU”, 2004. 
181 Ibid. 
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where integration was reaffirmed as a long-term and multi-faceted commitment. Based on the 
CBPs, the integration of immigrants is comprised of 11 principles. First and foremost, the 
Council states that “integration is a dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation by all 
migrants and residents of Member States”, stressing that: 
Everyone resident in the EU must adapt and adhere closely to the values of the European Union, as well as to 
member states’ laws. The provision and values enshrined in the European Treaties serve as both baseline and 
compass, as they are common to the Member States.182 
CBPs include the “respect for the provisions of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Union, 
which enshrine the concepts of dignity, freedom, equality and non-discrimination, solidarity, 
citizens’ rights and justice’183 The document continues emphasizing that “views and opinions 
which may not be compatible with such basic values might hinder the integration of immigrants 
into their new host society”.  The CBPs go on to emphasize the importance of employment; 
knowledge of the host society’s language, history and institutions (CBP4); education; 
participation in the democratic process; and equal access to public goods and services. Finally, 
they conclude that clear indicators and evaluation mechanisms are of outmost importance in the 
development of goals and improved policy. All of the above aim at the effective integration of 
immigrants.  
 In 2009, a platform of dialogue was created – European Integration Forum – between 
civil society organization and European institutions, which in 2015 became the European 
Migration Forum184. Also, the European Fund for the Integration of TCNs (EIF)185 was created 
that ran between 2007 and 2013; it was later included in the Asylum Migration and Integration 
                                                 
182 European Commission, “Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy In The EU”, 2004. 
183 Ibid.  
184 European Economic and Social Committee (EESC)- European Migration Forum 
 http://www.eesc.europa.eu/en/sections-other-bodies/other/european-migration-forum 
185 European Commission, “European Fund for The Integration of Third-Country Nationals 2007-2013”, 
Directorate-General Justice, Freedom & Security, 2007. 
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Fund (AMIF)186. The European Network of Cities for Local Integration Policies for Migrants 
(CLIP)187 created in 2007 is an example of an initiative at the local level to promote migrant 
integration. These initiatives show an effort to help the integration of immigrants at the local 
level aiming to promote a common EU direction to immigrant integration.   
 The European Handbook on Integration188  was published for the third time in 2010, 
published earlier in 2007 and 2004, aiming at the effective guidance of policy-makers and 
practitioners on immigrant integration based on EU standards. In the handbook the core chapters 
discuss integration programs and civic participation. The same year, at the Zaragoza Ministerial 
Conference189, a common set of integration indicators was adopted in order to better monitor the 
integration policies across Europe. Interestingly, the conference started with a chapter on 
‘promoting European values’. We can see that civic participation is central in the EU approach to 
integration with the respect & promotion of EU values being an integral part of what civic 
integration means.  
 The “European Web Site on Integration: Migrant Integration Information and good 
practices”190 launched in 2009 was an important step to effectively communicate information 
relating to immigrant integration with practitioners and other integration stakeholders. The Web 
Site features news, good practices, funding opportunities and country specific research on 
national governance structures and evaluation on integration outcomes for the 28 Member States. 
Finally, it includes Europe’s overall research on integration. With the European Web Site on 
                                                 
186  European Commission – Migration and Home Affairs, Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) 
https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/financing/fundings/migration-asylum-borders/asylum-migration-integration-
fund_en 
187Eurofound – European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions 
https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/about-clip 
188 European Commission, “Handbook on Integration for policy-makers and practitioners, 2010.  
189 Declaration of the European Ministerial Conference on Integration, ZARAGOZA, 2010. 
190 European Commission, “European Web Site on Integration: Migrant Integration Information and Good 
Practices”, https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/home. 
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Integration, Europe’s efforts towards immigrant integration are readily available for anyone 
interested in searching and getting easily informed about EU’s and individual EU countries’ 
forthcoming integration steps.  
 In 2007, the EU Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) 191  was formed – replacing the 
European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) dating back in 1998 – to 
strengthen the protection of fundamental rights. The agency includes findings, knowledge, and 
advice from independent and comparative research many times directly related to immigrants 
and refugees to raise awareness of their rights. On the legislative level, the European Union 
implemented a Framework Decision in 2008 “on combating certain forms and expressions of 
racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law”192, which Member States were obliged to 
implement in their national laws by 2010. Additionally, in 2009, the Treaty of Lisbon came into 
force after its adoption in 2007; the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union made 
it legally binding. It was the first time that the primary law of the European Union provided a 
legal basis for the promotion of immigrant integration at the European level, although the 
immigrant integration policies still remained at the discretion of the Member States. The EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights promoted the freedom of speech and religion, as well as the 
rights of equality and non-discrimination; integral rights for the successful integration of 
immigrants.  
 The Stockholm Programme193 set out the European Union’s priorities for the area of 
justice, freedom and security building on the achievements of the Tampere and Hague programs 
for the period of 2010-2014. It set as a priority the effective knowledge, exchange, and 
                                                 
191 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, http://fra.europa.eu/en 
192  Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA, on combating certain forms and expressions of racism and 
xenophobia by means of criminal law, 2008. 
193 Council of the European Union, “The Stockholm Programme – An open and secure Europe serving and 
protecting the citizens”, 2009. 
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coordination with other relevant policy areas, such as employment (Europe 2020194) and social 
inclusion (EU Youth Strategy for period 2010-2018195). In 2011, the European Agenda for the 
Integration of TCNs 196  was created targeting specific integration aspects that needed to be 
prioritized. Importantly, it stated that “well integrated migrants enrich the EU economically and 
culturally”. The European Agenda came as a replacement to the Common Agenda for Integration 
responding to increased migration and cultural diversity in recent years. In 2014, the Asylum, 
Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF)197 was adopted to run until 2020 in order to finance 
immigrant integration. The European Agenda for Integration focused on four specific factors of 
immigrant integration: anti-discrimination, and economic, social, and cultural participation.  
 In 2016, the Action Plan198 on the integration of third country nationals was created. The 
Action Plan stated that it is important for people rightfully and legitimately residing in Europe to 
be able to participate and contribute in society as it will be “key to the future well-being, 
prosperity and cohesion of European societies.” Stressing the increasing levels of discrimination, 
prejudice, racism and xenophobia, the European Commission stated that it is Europe’s legal, 
moral and economic imperatives to uphold fundamental rights, values and freedoms. The 
European Commission concluded that the integration of immigrants is a common interest to all 
Member States and that investing in immigrant integration policies will lead to positive long-run 
effects. The policy priorities set by the Action Plan focus on pre-departure and pre-arrival 
measures; education; labour market & vocational training; access to basic services; and active 
participation and social inclusion. Such goals will be achieved through policies, funding 
opportunities, mutual learning initiatives and resources such as websites and reports.  
                                                 
194 European Commission, “Europe 2020 strategy: A strategy for smart, sustainable, and inclusive growth”, 2010. 
195 European Commission, “Youth Strategy 2010-2018”, 2009. 
196 European Commission, “The European Agenda for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals”, 2011.  
197 European Commission, “Migration and Home Affairs, Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF)”, 2014.  
198European Commission, “Action Plan of the Integration of Third Country Nationals”, 2016. 
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 Finally, on November of 2017, the European Union opened a 25-million-euro worth call 
for proposals. Projects are expected to run from 2018 to 2021. The AMIF call for proposals is 
comprised of five funding themes reflecting the policy priorities identified by the Action Plan. 
The themes are the following: raising awareness on migrant’s contribution to EU societies; 
community building at the local level, including volunteering activities; pre-departure and post-
arrival support for the integration of persons in need of international protection; promotion of 
swift integration of TCNs into the labor market; integration of victims of trafficking in human 
beings. Thus, we can see that the current EU steps of immigrant integration focus on the socio-
economic participation of immigrants in their host countries.  
 As mentioned above, the European agenda emphasizes on the integration of migrants 
under the fulfillment of immigrants’ rights and the benefits of the host country. However, it can 
be unclear as of what exactly the integration of immigrants entails.  Nevertheless, one can argue 
that all the aforementioned, proposed policies focus on the nations’ commitment to equal 
opportunities, equal treatment and equal access to services. On same line, immigrants are 
expected to integrate and enable their skills to actively participate in the host countries and 
contribute to their development. Thus, integration is a two-way process of mutual 
accommodation but also mutual benefit by all migrants and residents of Member States. The 
successful integration of immigrants will be achieved with the collaboration of the public sector, 
civil society and private-sector organizations.  
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2.4 Measuring Immigrant Integration 
 In this section, I will analyze the multiple dimensions of integration policies as identified 
by the Migration Integration Policy Index (MIPEX). Although other indices might exist using 
some similar indicators, MIPEX is the only index that uses up-to-date, comprehensive research 
data and analysis. MIPEX can be used as an effective tool to assess, compare and improve 
integration policy. MIPEX gives full access to its results and allows researchers to delve into the 
multiple factors that affect the integration of immigrants. It also allows for the analysis of 
changes in policy.  
 MIPEX looks at 167 policy indicators in order to evaluate and compare the policies that 
governments implement to integrate migrants at the countries analyzed. It looks at all the EU 
Member States and also Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, Norway, 
Switzerland, Turkey and the United States. It analyzes eight policy areas of integration: labour 
market mobility, education of children, political participation, family reunion, access to 
nationality, health, permanent residence and anti-discrimination. For each policy area MIPEX 
identifies the highest European and international standards drawn from the Council of European 
Conventions, European Union Directives and international conventions. If only minimum 
standards exist, MIPEX uses European-wide policy recommendations.  
 
2.4.1 Labour Market Mobility 
 This policy area examines if legally-resident foreign citizens have equal workers’ rights 
and opportunities in relation to nationals’ access to jobs and if they are able to improve their 
skills. This policy area was created in response to the European Commission’s ten year vision for 
the future of vocational education and training in a Communication titled ‘A new impetus for 
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European cooperation in vocational education and training to support the Europe 2020 
strategy’199 Thus, economic and employment guidelines for the integration of migrants were 
revised according to the Europe 2020 strategy. According to guideline 8, the aim is to “develop a 
skilled workforce responding to labour market needs, promoting job quality and lifelong 
learning”.200 Successful labour market outcomes for immigrants are key in their success in the 
receiving society and are the most important step towards integration.201 This policy area is 
divided in four indicators and its indicator is then subdivided in several others. 
(1) Access: Measures the extent to which migrant workers and their families have access to and 
are able to change jobs in all sectors in relation to national workers. 
a. Immediate Access to Labour Market 
b. Access to Private Sector 
c. Access to Public Sector 
d. Immediate Access to Self-employment 
e. Access to Full self-employment 
Immediate access examines if all or some categories of foreign residents (permanent residents, 
residents on temporary work permits, residents on family reunion permits) have equal access to 
employment or self-employment respectively. Access examines the extent to which the 
conditions are equal.  
(2) Access to general support: Measures the extent to which migrant workers and their families 
are able to improve and get recognized the same skills and qualifications in relation to 
national workers.  
                                                 
199 European Commission, “A new impetus for European cooperation in Vocational Education and Training to 
support the Europe 2020 strategy”, 2010.  
200 European Commission, “Europe2020, Integrated guidelines for the economic and employment policies of the 
Members” 2010. 
201 Lodovici, “Making a success of integrating immigrants in the labour market”, 2010. 
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a. Public Employment Services 
b. Education & Vocational Training 
c. Study Grants 
d. Recognition of Academic Qualifications 
e. Recognition of Professional Qualifications 
f. Validation of Skills  
(3) Targeted Support: Measures the extent to which migrants can have their specific needs 
addressed as workers born and trained abroad through different policies.  
a. State Facilitation of Recognition Qualifications 
b. Economic Integration measures of TCNs 
c. Economic Integration measures of youth and women 
d. Support to access public employment services 
e. Active Information policy 
(4) Workers’ rights: Measures the extent to which migrants are enjoying the same work and 
social security rights like national workers.  
a. Membership in Trade Unions and Work-related Negotiation Bodies 
b. Access to Social Security 
c. Access to Housing 
d. Working Conditions 
 
2.4.2 Family Reunion for Foreign Citizens 
 This policy area analyzes the extent to which legally-resident foreign citizens have a right 
to reunite with their families. The policy area was created in response to the right to family and 
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family life under European and international law. Importantly, the EU Family Reunion 
Directive202 established the right to family reunion for non-EU sponsors and their families. The 
Directive establishes the right of immigrants to bring their non-EU national spouse, under-age 
children and the children of their spouse to the EU State in which they reside. The Family 
Reunion for Foreign Citizens policy area measures the extent to which countries promote this 
right as a means to promote integration.  
(1) Eligibility: Measures if all legal foreign residents are able to apply to sponsor their whole 
family 
(2) Conditions for Acquisition of Status: Measures what are the pre-entry, post-entry and other 
conditions for the acquisition of status in relation to nationals.  
(3) Security of Status: Measures if the state protects applicants from discretionary procedures. 
(4) Rights Associated with Status: Measures if family members enjoy the same residence and 
socio-economic rights as their sponsor.        
    
2.4.3 Education  
 This policy area assesses if immigrant children are encouraged to achieve and develop 
their skills in school in comparison to the children of nationals. OECD’s Programme for 
International Student Assessment203  (PISA) is a very useful source for the measurement of 
educational attainment as part of the integration of immigrant children across countries. Studies 
have shown that education systems are more successful in the integration of immigrants if they 
                                                 
202 Council Directive 2003/86/EC on the right to family reunification, 2003. 
203 OECD, Programme for International Student Assessment, http://www.oecd.org/pisa/ 
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target their needs. Also, immigrants do better when education is compulsory for a longer period 
of time, when late ability tracking exists, and there are more teaching hours.204 
(1) Access: Measures if all immigrant children –with or without legal status – have equal access 
to all levels of education  
(2) Targeting Needs: Measures the extent that immigrant children, parents and their teachers are 
provided with specific support in order to address their education needs.  
(3) New Opportunities: Measures the extent to which immigrant languages and cultures are 
cultivated in school enriching the school environment.  
(4) Intercultural Education for All: Measures if all pupils and teachers are supported to learn and 
work together in a diverse society.         
  
2.4.4 Political Participation 
 This policy area evaluates if legally-resident foreign citizens enjoy the same rights to 
participation in political life as national citizens. The policy area was created in response to the 
European Parliament advocating for voting rights at the local level for all foreign residents since 
1996.205 However, even if both the European Parliament and the European Commission have 
advocated for “civic participation”206, they have not imposed it on Member States as they argue 
that it is outside the Community competences defined in the European Treaties.  Importantly, in 
the CBPs, which form the foundations of EU initiatives in the field of integration, it is stated that 
“The participation of immigrants in the democratic process and in the formulation of integration 
                                                 
204 European Commission, “Study on educational support for newly arrived migrant children”, 2013.  
205 European Parliament, “Trends In The Eu-27 Regarding Participation Of Third-Country Nationals In The Host 
Country's Political Life” Area of Freedom, Security, & Justice, 2007. 
206 Ibid. 
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policies and measures, especially at the local level, supports their integration” 207(CBP 9) 
(1) Electoral Rights: Measures if legally-resident foreign citizens are allowed to vote and stand 
as candidates in all kinds of elections in comparison to national citizens.  
(2) Political Liberties: Measures if legally-resident foreign citizens are able to join and form 
political parties and associations in relation to national citizens. 
(3) Consultative Bodies: Measures if these strong and independent advisory bodies are 
comprised of immigrant representatives or associations.  
(4) Implementation Policies: Measures if there are campaigns and/or funds in place to encourage 
immigrants and their associations to participate in political life.     
   
2.4.5 Permanent Residency 
 This policy area analyzes the extent that temporary-legal foreign residents have access to 
a long-term residence permit. The policy area was created in response to the 2003 Council 
Directive which states that the status of long-term residency208 should be awarded to a person of 
foreign origin who has lived legally in the European Union more than five years. This status 
allows equal treatment and rights as nationals in the access to employment and self-employed 
activity, education and vocational training, social protection and assistance, access to goods and 
services. The granting of permanent residency to TCNs who have been legally residing in 
Europe is important in promoting their integration and coming closer to economic, social, 
cultural, and political cohesion. The share of TCNs that acquire permanent residence is one of 
                                                 
207 European Commission, “Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy in the EU”, 2004. 
208 Council Directive 2003/109/EC concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents, 
2003. 
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the proposed EU indicators of immigrant integration in the area of ‘active citizenship’.209 
(1) Eligibility: Measures if all temporary legal residents are eligible to apply for a long-term 
residence permit. 
(2) Conditions for Acquisition of Status: Measures if applicants of long-term residency status 
have to fulfil the same conditions as European nationals.  
(3) Security of Status: Measures the extent to which the state protects applicants from 
discretionary procedures. 
(4) Rights Associated with Status: Measures the extent to which long-term residents are granted 
the same socio-economic rights in comparison to European nationals.    
  
2.4.6 Access to Nationality 
 This policy area examines if legal residents are encouraged to naturalize and if their 
children who are born in the country are entitled to become full citizens. This policy area was 
created in response to the many times all two complicated naturalization processes that exist. 
Although it is important for the naturalization process to ensure that perspective new members of 
the society meet the necessary requirements to become successful citizens, a process that is too 
complicated can be counterproductive. Thus, such a process can inhibit the very integration it 
seeks to facilitate. It has been found that naturalization leads to better employment outcomes and 
higher levels of social and political participation.210,211 
(1) Eligibility: Measures the length of time that immigrants must wait in order to naturalize. It 
                                                 
209 European Commission, “Action Plan on the Integration of Third-Country Nationals”, 2016 
210 OECD, “Naturalization: A Passport for the Better Integration of Immigrants?”, 2011. 
211 Bilgili et al. “The Dynamics between Integration Policies and Outcomes: a Synthesis of the Literature”, 2015. 
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also looks if children and grandchildren born in the country are entitled to become citizens.  
(2) Conditions for Acquisition: Measures the extent that immigrants are encouraged to succeed 
through the conditions required for naturalization.  
(3) Security of Status: Measures the extent to which the country protects applicants from 
discretionary procedures. 
(4) Dual Nationality: Measures if countries allow naturalizing migrants and their children to be 
citizens of more than one country.         
  
2.4.7 Anti-discrimination 
 This policy area examines if all residents have effective legal protection from racial, 
ethnic, religious and nationality discrimination in all areas of life. This policy area was created in 
response to the increasingly negative sentiment against immigrants and wants to examine if and 
how immigrants perceive discrimination and the governments’ response. Importantly, 
governments are not able to directly control discrimination. However, they can respond to 
discrimination by providing access to justice and creating effective procedures to alleviate the 
experience of discrimination.  
(1) Definitions and Concepts: Measures if all residents are protected from racial, ethnic, 
religious, and nationality discrimination under the law. 
(2) Fields of Application: Measures if the law tackles all areas of life. 
(3) Enforcement Mechanisms: Measures if victims of discrimination are encouraged to bring 
forward their case. 
(4) Equality Policies: Measures if all residents are able to benefit from the government’s 
commitments to equality and independent equality policies. 
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2.4.8 Health  
 This policy examines the extent to which the health care system is responsive to 
immigrants’ needs. It was created with the collaboration of MPG (Migration Policy Group), IOM 
(International Organization for Migration), and COST Action ADAPT (Adapting European 
Health Services to Diversity). COST is the European Association for European Cooperation in 
Science and Technology. This policy area responds to the recommendation of the Council of 
Europe in 2011 on mobility, migration and access to health care.212 The IOM created its own 
project ‘Equi-Health’213 to supplement the financing of the Health strand. IOM’s project is co-
financed by the EU’s Directorate-General Health and Food Safety (DG SANTE) through the 
Consumers, Health, Agriculture and Food Executive Agency (CHAFEA). Overall, health 
policies have been added only recently to Europe’s integration policy agenda.  
(1) Entitlement to Health Services: Measures if health services are entitled equally between 
immigrants and nationals.  
(2) Policies to Facilitate Access: Measures the extent that policies facilitate migrants’ access to 
health entitlements. 
(3) Responsive Health Services: Measures the extent that policies are becoming more responsive 
to immigrants’ needs.  
(4) Measures to Achieve Change: Measures government’s support to mare health services more 
responsive to immigrants’ needs 
 
                                                 
212 Council of Europe, “Explanatory Memorandum of the draft Recommendation CM/Rec(2011)13 of the 
Committee of Ministers to member states on mobility, migration and access to health care”, 2011. 
213 IOM, “Fostering Health Provision for Migrants, the Roma, and other Vulnerable Groups”, 2015. 
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2.5 – Conclusion 
 The integration of third-country nationals has been at the center of EU policy since the 
1990s. Since then, there have been a lot of normative developments and policy changes that are 
connected to the literature around integration. Integration is part of migration management 
aiming to secure rights, security, and social inclusion to third-country nationals. As emphasized 
in the CBP, integration is seen as dynamic two-way that is facilitated by both migrants and the 
member states. Thus, even if the EU has been aiming towards a collective response to migration 
and immigrant integration, member states are still the ones responsible for immigrant integration. 
In its process of converge, the EU has increasingly been using soft-law governance techniques. 
Employment has been given great emphasis in this process. In regard to migrants’ cultural 
integration there is great ambivalence which reflects the complicated national histories 
responding to minorities and new immigrants in different EU states. The literature around 
immigrants and the integration of migrants has been extensive. There has been a lot of academic 
debate about how immigrant integration works, the efficacy of certain approaches to immigrant 
integration, and whether or not integration policies for immigrants are converging. On the policy 
level, the EU has commissioned some researchers to find the best indicators that determine 
immigrant integration. MIPEX is the most effective tool yet developed analyzing immigrant 
integration in eight policy areas. Overall, starting in the 1990s, Europe has aimed at the creation 
of a common EU policy on migration and immigrant integration and has taken important steps 
towards its aim.  
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Chapter Three: Labor Market Impact of Immigrant Integration 
3.1 Introduction 
 While migration is increasing, the debates around its effect on the labor market have been 
extensive. Most theorists conclude on the overall positive effects of migration on the labor 
market. In relation to the impact of migration on the wages and employment of native workers, 
the literature has also shown that the impact is either zero or positive. Recently, the literature has 
developed arguing for immigrants’ positive contribution to society and development with their 
successful integration. However, there has been limited economic research examining how the 
integration of migrants will specifically affect the wages and employment of native workers. 
 In this chapter I will examine the impact of immigrant integration policies on labor 
market outcomes, specifically the employment rate. I will look at the effect of the labor market 
immigrant integration as defined by The Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX)214 on the 
total employment rate and on the employment rate of different subgroups for various EU 
countries.  First, I will undertake a regression analysis for seventeen EU countries. Then, I will 
take a deeper look at the relationship between employment and labor market immigrant 
integration for six different countries: Austria, France, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, UK; 
countries that have been at the center of the immigrant integration debate. These steps will allow 
me to have a clearer picture of the impact of labor market immigrant integration on the 
employment of the labor force as a whole and for various groups.  
 The European Union has commissioned some researchers in order to find the best 
indicators that determine the success of immigrant integration and the factors that determine the 
immigrant integration outcomes. MIPEX is the most effective tool that has been developed. It 
analyzes integration in eight policy areas - labour market mobility, education of children, 
                                                 
214 Migrant Integration Policy Index 2015 – Labour Market Mobility, Policy http://www.mipex.eu/ 
  
65 
political participation, family reunion, access to nationality, health, permanent residence and 
anti-discrimination –based on the highest European and international standards drawn from the 
Council of European Conventions, European Union Directives and international conventions.215 
 I chose to focus on labor market immigrant integration since its importance has been 
increasingly emphasized in the EU.216 The EU has been aiming towards a collective response to 
migration and immigrant integration with the first step taken in 1999.217 However, after 2004, the 
EU started taking important steps towards a collective response to immigrant integration and 
since then labor market immigrant integration has been emphasized as an integral part of the 
process. The First Annual Report on Migration and Integration218, published in 2004, highlighted 
that the “access to employment” is “the most important political priority within national 
integration policies”. “Access to Employment” also appeared in the Common Basic Principles, 
the same year, as a “key part of the integration process”219 making immigrants’ contributions to 
society visible (CBP3).  As recently as 2016220, employment was again highlighted as a core 
element of the immigrant integration process with the European Commission urging countries to 
focus their efforts on the promotion of labour market integration of third-country nationals. 
Labor market integration for migrants has been at the center of immigrant integration policies 
from the beginning since today. 
 Further, I chose to examine the impact of the integration of migrants on the total 
employment since there has been a great rhetoric around immigrants taking jobs away from 
natives. 221  Total employment 222  will be disaggregated in non-EU 223 , low-skill224 , young225 , 
                                                 
215 see chapter two, section 2.4, p.54 
216 see chapter two, section 2.3, p.47 
217 Tampere European Council 15 And 16 October 1999. 
218 European Commission, “Annual Report on Migration and Integration”, 1st Report; 2004 
219 European Commission, “Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy In The EU”, 2004 
220 European Commission, “Action Plan of the Integration of Third Country Nationals”, 2016. 
221 See chapter one. 
  
66 
old226, and female227 employment. Total employment and the disaggregations of employment 
will be measured by looking at the respective employment rates as calculated from Eurostat 
data 228 . Disaggregating the total employment rate in different subgroups will allow me to 
examine how labor market immigrant integration might have differently affected the 
employment of various groups. As some economists have argued, some groups are 
disproportionately affected by immigration. Borjas has repeatedly emphasized the negative 
impact on the low-skill labor force.229 This disaggregation will allow me to examine if and how 
different groups are affected by labor market immigrant integration.  
 My results are based on the time period of 2007-2014. These are the years that data from 
MIPEX, the most crucial variable, are available. In order to choose the countries for my research 
I ranked them according to two measures. First, their rank as a destination country in the EU 
from 2007-2014 and second their rank according to their performance in Labor Market 
Immigrant Integration (MIPEXL) from the same time period. I limited my analysis to the first 15 
countries of each ranking; 11 countries were both in the destination ranking and the MIPEXL 
ranking. An additional 8 countries were either in the top-15 of the destination ranking or the 
MIPEXL ranking. This led me to an overall 19 countries. Croatia and Romania had to be 
                                                                                                                                                             
222 The employment rate of the total population is calculated by dividing the number of persons aged 20-64 in 
employment by the total population in the same age group. 
223 The employment rate of non-EU nationals is calculated by dividing the number of citizens outside the EU-28 in 
employment aged 20-64 by the total number of citizens inside the EU-28 in the same age group. 
224 The employment rate of low skilled persons is calculated by dividing the number of persons in employment with 
at most lower secondary education and aged 20-64 by the total population in the same age and skill group. 
225 The employment rate of young persons is calculated by dividing the number of persons in employment and aged 
20-29 by the total population of the same age group. 
226 The employment rate of older workers is calculated by diving the number of persons in employment and aged 55-
64 by the total population of the same age group. 
227 The employment rate of women is calculated by dividing the number of women aged 20-64 in employment by 
the total female population of the same age group. 
228 Eurostat, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/lfs/data/database. 
229 See chapter one, section 1.4, p.15 
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excluded from the sample as there is limited data for their MIPEXL performance throughout 
these years. Overall, this led me to have a sample size of 17 countries.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2 Regression Analysis 
 My analysis uses panel data, the analysis of data over time, for 17 countries over 2007-
2014 time period. One can estimate panel data using three different methods; 1) Pooled Data 
OLS, 2) Fixed Effects, 3) Random Effects. The OLS estimation is no longer the most efficient 
method of estimation because it is very likely to be biased.230 Thus, in order to decide if I should 
use a fixed effects model or a random effects model, I run the Hausman test. The Hausman test 
analyzes if there is a correlation between the unique errors and the regressors in the model. If no 
correlation between the two exists (the null hypothesis), then the Hausman test will suggest the 
random effects model. If the p-value is less than 0.05, we should reject the null hypothesis. 
According to the results listed below, the null hypothesis was accepted thus the random-effects-
model was the one suggested for my panel data. 
                                                 
230 Desilva, “Panel Data Methods” 
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 This figure shows the Hausman test results for the total employment rate of the seventeen 
EU countries. I run the test of all the different dependent variables and came up with the same 
results. Thus, I will be running six different random effects models. My dependent variable will 
change: total, non-EU, low-skill, young, old, and female employment.231 In the random effects 
models, I have accounted for different determinants of employment. These include: the inflation 
rate (annual percentage)232, GDP growth (annual percentage)233, trade (percentage of GDP)234, 
size of the service sector measured by gross value added at current basic prices (in millions of 
national currency)235, bargaining power of unions measured by trade union density rate (%)236, 
and last but not least MIPEXL measured by a ranking number out of 100237.  
                                                 
231 Eurostat, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/lfs/data/database 
232 World Bank, Inflation - consumer prices (annual %), https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG 
233 World Bank, GDP growth (annual %),https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG 
234 World Bank, Trade (% of GDP), https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS 
235 OECD, Value Added by Activity, https://data.oecd.org/natincome/value-added-by-activity.htm 
236 ILO, Trade Union Density Rate (%), 
http://www.ilo.org/ilostat/faces/oracle/webcenter/portalapp/pagehierarchy/Page27.jspx?indicator=ILR_TUMT_NO
C_RT&subject=IR&datasetCode=A&collectionCode=IR&_adf.ctrl-
state=8d7wcc62g_4&_afrLoop=1748931627899516#! 
237 Migrant Integration Policy Index, http://www.mipex.eu/ 
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3.2.1 Model 1: Total Employment Rate and MIPEXL  
 
Etotalit = β0 + β1MIPEXLit + β2inflationit + β3growthit + β3tradeit + β4servicesit + β5bargaining + eit 
 
 The analysis uses panel data for 17 countries over 2007-2014 time period. MIPEXL is 
our variable of interest and total employment rate is our dependent variable. Rest of X’s in this 
model are the control variables. The error term is indicated by eit. 
 
 For total employment we can see that the service sector plays a really important role 
negatively affecting it causing a 7.15% negative change. This result could be due to the fact that 
the labour market is undergoing a change in the kinds of jobs that are created, which leads to a 
negative impact on employment until the skills of the labour force change.  Inflation positively 
affects the total employment rate, which is what we would expect. As inflation increases, the 
price level and output increase leading to increased employment. MIPEXL, which is the 
determinant of employment we are paying closer attention to, positively affects the employment 
of the total labor force causing an 8.72% change. This result is what was expected from our 
theory. Labor market immigrant integration will positively affect the employment rate of the 
total labor force as it will complementary respond to the labour market leading to increased level 
of output and thus increased wages and employment. Trade openness negatively effects the total 
employment; a result that was expected. Trade openness is associated with higher unemployment 
and wage inequality.  
 The rest of the determinants are not statistically significant. Nevertheless, we can see that 
bargaining power has a slight negative effect on employment, which is an expected result as 
unions demand higher wages expecting a small drop in the overall employment. Unions utility 
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will increase if the demand curve for labour is inelastic because the wage-employment trade-off 
will be minimized. Finally, growth also negatively effects total employment; a rather surprising 
result. We could expect growth to positively affect employment.  
 
3.2.2 Model 2:  Non-EU Employment Rate and MIPEXL  
 
Eneuit = β0 + β1MIPEXLit + β2inflationit + β3growthit + β3tradeit + β4servicesit + β5bargaining + eit 
 
 The analysis uses panel data for 17 countries over 2007-2014 time period. MIPEXL is 
our variable of interest and non-EU employment rate is our dependent variable. Rest of X’s in 
this model are the control variables. The error term is indicated by eit. 
 
 For non-EU employment we can see that the services sector plays a really important role 
negatively affecting non-EU employment. This could result as there has been a change in the 
jobs created, which leads to a negative effect in employment until the skills of the non-EU labour 
force change. For example, it could be because non-EU workers do not speak the native 
language thus they are not able to be incorporated in the service sector where language plays 
such an integral part. The bargaining power of unions negatively affects the employment of non-
EU workers causing a negative change of 21.8%. This could be because the demand curve for 
non-EU workers is more elastic thus is more negatively affected in comparison to total 
employment. Also, unions could be more focused on the rights of the native labor force causing 
adverse effects for the immigrant labor force. Inflation causes a positive change of 5.4%, an 
expected result as more inflation means higher price level and output and thus employment. 
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Trade openness negative effects the employment of non-EU workers. As said, trade openness is 
associated with higher unemployment and wage inequality.  
 GDP growth and MIPEXL are not statistically significant. Nevertheless, growth has a 
negative impact on non-EU employment. MIPEXL positively affects the employment of non-EU 
workers causing a small change of 2.3%. We would expect MIPEXL to be statistically 
significant and have a greater positive impact on non-EU employment as MIPEXL is designed to 
integrate migrants into the labor force and thus we would expect to boost their employment. Our 
results could be explained because according to MIPEX238, even if labour market policies focus 
on helping immigrants to find a job they mostly succeed after 10+ years and they also offer jobs 
of lower quality, below migrants’ qualification or below the poverty line. Thus, labor market 
integration policies are not yet very effective in successfully integrating immigrants.  
  
3.2.3 Model 3:  Low-Skilled Employment Rate and MIPEXL  
 
Elowit = β0 + β1MIPEXLit + β2inflationit + β3growthit + β3tradeit + β4servicesit + β5bargaining + eit 
 
 The analysis uses panel data for 17 countries over 2007-2014 time period. MIPEXL is 
our variable of interest and low-skilled employment rate is our dependent variable. Rest of X’s in 
this model are the control variables. The error term is indicated by eit. 
 
 For the low-skilled labor force, the service sector negatively impacts employment. The 
impact is less than the total employment rate. This result is in alignment with our expectations as 
more and more low-skilled labour force in the EU is employed in the service sector. Trade also 
                                                 
238 Huddleston et.al, “Integration Policies: Who Benefits? – Policy Brief”, MIPEX, 2015. 
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plays an important role adversely affecting low-skilled employment causing a 9.29% negative 
change. Trade openness makes the market more competitive and jobs at the low-end of the 
spectrum are increasingly moving to countries with less expensive labour. Additionally, the EU 
labor market is increasingly demanding more professional labour. Inflation positively affects the 
employment of the low-skilled labor force in the same line as it affects the employment of the 
total labor force.  
 The rest of the determinants are statistically insignificant. MIPEXL, although statistically 
insignificant, positively affects the employment of low-skilled workers causing a 7.87% change. 
This is in alignment with our expected results as, with labour market immigrant integration, the 
labour market is more efficient and low-skilled workers are positively affected.  Bargaining 
power positively affects low-skilled workers. This result, if statistically significant, could mean 
that unions are effective in benefiting disadvantaged labor force groups like the low-skilled. GDP 
growth also positively affects the employment of low-skilled persons. This could mean not only 
that growth occurred but that it also occurred in sectors that needed low-skilled labour.  
 
3.2.4 Model 4: Young Labor Force Employment Rate and MIPEXL  
 
Eyoungit = β0 + β1MIPEXLit + β2inflationit + β3growthit + β3tradeit + β4servicesit + β5bargaining + eit 
 
 The analysis uses panel data for 17 countries over 2007-2014 time period. MIPEXL is 
our variable of interest and the employment rate of the young labor force is our dependent 
variable. Rest of X’s in this model are the control variables. The error term is indicated by eit. 
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For the young labour force, the service sector has a significant and important negative impact on 
their employment. This could be caused as the young labour force is increasingly more educated 
and their employment is mostly determined by higher-level jobs. Trade openness also negatively 
impacts the employment of the young labor force. We can see that trade openness affects the 
young labour force at a greater rate than the total labour force. This could be caused because the 
demand for young labor force is more elastic due to greater substitutability. Inflation positively 
affects the employment of young people for the reasons mentioned earlier.  
 All other factors are statistically insignificant. MIPEXL, although statistically 
insignificant, positively affects the employment of young workers with a 6.87% change. 
Bargaining power negatively affects the employment of young workers. This result, if 
statistically significant, could be due to the fact that unions are balancing a wage-employment 
trade-off. Since, younger workers would be the ones not yet employed or the ones lastly 
employed, they are the ones most likely affected by this trade-off. Finally, GDP growth 
negatively affects the employment of young workers; a result not expected.  
 
3.2.5 Model 5:  Old Labor Force Employment Rate and MIPEXL  
 
Eoldit = β0 + β1MIPEXLit + β2inflationit + β3growthit + β3tradeit + β4servicesit + β5bargaining + eit 
 
 The analysis uses panel data for 17 countries over 2007-2014 time period. MIPEXL is 
our variable of interest and the employment rate of the old labor force is our dependent variable. 
Rest of X’s in this model are the control variables. The error term is indicated by eit. 
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 The employment of the old labour force is significantly and positively affected by 
MIPEXL causing an 18.7% positive change. This is a rather interesting finding, but it could be 
that the non-EU labour force integration is highly complementary to older workers and their 
successful integration boosts this complementarity. Trade openness also results in positive 
effects for the employment of the old labor force. This is a surprising finding as the old labor 
force is the only one positively affected by trade openness. The rest of the determinants are 
statistically insignificant.  
 
3.2.6 Model 6:  Female Labor Force Employment Rate and MIPEXL 
 
Efemaleit = β0 + β1MIPEXLit + β2inflationit + β3growthit + β3tradeit + β4servicesit + β5bargaining + eit 
 
 The analysis uses panel data for 17 countries over 2007-2014 time period. MIPEXL is 
our variable of interest and the employment rate of the female labor force is our dependent 
variable. Rest of X’s in this model are the control variables. The error term is indicated by eit. 
 
 Looking at the female labor force employment rate, we can see that MIPEXL, one of the 
two most statistical significant determinants of female employment, is causing a 9.96% positive 
change to the employment of the female labor force. This effect could happen as non-EU labor 
force is over-represented in the service sector and also in jobs where the employer is the 
household239. With the non-EU labor force employed in the household, women have a greater 
chance to be employed in the labor market as they do not need to do domestic work. However, 
                                                 
239 Eichhorst et al., “The Integration of Migrants and its Effects on the Labour Market”, IZA Research Report No. 
40, 2011. 
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the service sector negatively impacts the employment of female labor force. This is a rather 
surprising result as according to the World Bank 84.08%240 of the total female labor force in the 
EU were employed in the service sector. Thus, we would expect that an increase in the service 
sector would positively affect the female employment. Last but not least, inflation has a positive 
impact on female employment. The rest of the variables are not statistically significant.  
 
 Overall, focusing at MIPEXL we can conclude that from the random effects model 
regression analysis it is a determinant with statistical significance for the total employment of the 
seventeen EU-country labor force causing on average an 8.72% positive change. Disaggregating 
the total employment in different groups, MIPEXL positively affects all the disaggregations of 
employment. However, for the non-EU, low, and young labor force the effects of the MIPEXL 
policies are not statistically significant.  
 According to MIPEX241, most labour market policies focus on helping migrants find a 
job. However, most of them succeed after 10+ years and they also offer jobs of lower quality, 
below migrants’ qualifications or below the poverty line. Most policies provide basic 
information and access to most types of jobs, self-employment and trainings. Traditional 
migration countries and most Western European countries are increasingly investing in more 
effective general and targeted programs. However, a lot of them are too new or small to reach the 
groups most in need. Overall, very few countries have a comprehensive integration strategy; nor 
does the EU.  Thus, all of the above reasons could explain our results. Also, having had a larger 
time period our results could be significantly different. 
 
                                                 
240 World Bank, Employment in services, female (% of female employment) 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.SRV.EMPL.FE.ZS?end=2014&locations=EU&start=2007&view=chart 
241 Huddleston et.al, “Integration Policies: Who Benefits? – Policy Brief”,MIPEX, 2015. 
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3.3 Individual Country Analysis  
 In this section I look at specific countries and I will analyze the correlation between labor 
market immigrant integration policies and employment. The correlation coefficients will allow 
me to see the statistical relationship between MIPEXL and employment in total and 
disaggregated for different subgroups. From the table below, we can see that for most countries 
there is a negative correlation between the total employment of the labor force and MIPEXL. 
Countries with a positive correlation between total employment and MIPEXL are Austria, 
Germany, Netherlands and Poland. For my extensive analysis, I will look more closely at 
Austria, France, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden and the UK. Expect Sweden, these countries 
have been central countries in the integration literature for their different approaches to 
integration.242 Sweden is included in my country analysis as it is the country ranked 1st for its 
MIPEXL polices.  
 
 
                                                 
242 See chapter two, section 2.2, p.35 
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3.3.1 Austria AT 
 Austria is a country with a long history of migration243, who despite having migrants, 
only in the last ten years has incorporated immigrant integration in its national policymaking.244 
Austria was one of the countries that took part in the Gastarbeiter (guest worker) program in the 
1960s accepting many temporary workers that later stayed creating Austria’s first large foreign 
population. 245  Throughout the Cold War, Austria received refugees from Eastern European 
countries, and in the 1990s, a massive influx of Yugoslavian refugees.246 In Austria there has 
been a high level of anti-immigrant sentiment, which has been slightly decreasing in recent 
years.247 For the period of 2007–2014, Austria is ranking 11th out of 17 EU-countries as an 
immigrant destination and 14th out of 17 EU-countries for its labor market immigrant integration 
policies. 
 Around 1/3 of working-age non-EU citizens are not in employment, education, or 
training; a ratio which is common across the EU248. Over the past decade, Austria’s MIPEXL 
score has increased dramatically. It increased from 42/100 in 2007 to 64/100 in 2014. This 
dramatic increase was mostly driven by the great change in targeted support which increased 
from 10/100 in 2007 to 80/100 in 2014. Austria’s public employment service (AMS), the 
Integration Fund (OIF), and the 2010 Integration Plan created many new programs to improve 
the position of low- and high- skilled immigrants. However, in Austria it is still hard for migrants 
to get their skills & foreign degrees recognized. Also, the access to public sector, self-
                                                 
243 Kraler & Jandl, “Austria: A Country of Immigration?”, Migration Policy Institute, 2003.  
244 Kraler & Reichel, “Measuring and Monitoring Immigrant Integration in Europe: Integration Policies and 
Monitoring Efforts in 17 European Countries”, The Netherlands Institute for Social Research, 2012, p. 43. 
245 Kraler & Jandl, “Austria: A Country of Immigration?” Migration Policy Institute, 2003, p.100. 
246 Ibid.  
247  Huddleston et.al, “Integration Policies: Who Benefits?” MIPEX, 2015. 
248 Ibid. 
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employment, and study grants is limited. Thus, we could argue that there is skill-mismatch with 
many of migrants’ potential being wasted. 
 We can see from the graphs above that MIPEXL policies have a strong positive 
correlation with the employment of the total labor force. This result goes in alignment with the 
ideal results from integration policies positively affecting the employment of the labor force. 
However, there is significant negative correlation between the low-skilled overall labor force and 
MIPEXL policies. Some economists have argued that low-skilled workers are one of the groups 
most affected by immigration, which according to this correlation could be proof for the Austrian 
labor market. Interestingly, there is a small negative correlation between MIPEXL and the 
employment of non-EU workers. Since 2011, labor market integration policies have significantly 
improved, however there are still improvements to be made. Targeted support has increased 
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dramatically making it easier for non-EU workers to get their needs addressed as workers born 
and trained abroad. However, it is still hard for immigrants to get their skills recognized. 
 
3.3.2 France FR 
 France has been a country of net migration since the 1950s. It is one of Europe’s oldest 
immigration countries with around 1/4th of its population having an immigrant background.249 
However, a sizeable minority of the overall French population holds anti-immigrant attitudes.250 
France is seen as the prototype of assimilationist integration policies in the EU, where the 
permanent nature of immigration is accepted but also the immigrant population is expected to 
assimilate with the majority. According to the French Jacobin tradition, what matters is the 
relationship between the individual and the state, without the interference of intermediaries.251 
For the period of 2007–2014, France is ranking 4th out of 17 EU-countries as an immigrant 
destination and 15th out of 17 EU-countries for its labor market immigrant integration policies. 
 As mentioned earlier in the chapter, across Europe there has been a consensus that labor 
market integration is of outmost importance. In France, in 2003, a new integration policy was 
formulated, in which language skills and education were considered even more important than 
the incorporation into the labor market. The idea behind this policy direction was that once 
migrants speak the native language and have acquired professional skills, their incorporation into 
the labor market will be easier.252  
                                                 
249 Huddleston et.al, “Integration Policies: Who Benefits?” MIPEX, 2015. 
250 European Social Survey, “Attitudes towards Immigration and their Antecedents: Topline Results from Round 7 
of the European Social Survey”, 2016. 
251 Entzinger & Biezeveld, “Benchmarking in Immigrant Integration”, European Research Centre on Migration and 
Ethnic Relations, 2003, p.14. 
252 Ibid, 47. 
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 France restricts and delays labor market integration more than most of EU countries. 
There is an estimated 5.3 million ‘jobs’ that are closed to non-EU migrants, while few are 
accessing education or training. ½ of non-EU citizens are out of employment and training while 
it is very common for immigrants to be in jobs below their qualifications or below the poverty 
line.253  
 France does not have data available for the employment of the overall population. There 
is an important negative correlation between the employment of the non-EU labor force and 
MIPEXL. This finding is not surprising since the French labor market integration policies have 
consistently been ineffective in helping the migrant labor force integrate into the labor market. 
Additionally, there is a significant negative correlation between the low-skilled overall labor 
force and MIPEXL policies. This could be due to the fact that MIPEXL policies are one of the 
worst in the EU, but other factors could affect the decline in the employment of the labor force. 
This could be a structural change in the overall labour market, where less low-skilled workforce 
is needed. The financial crisis of 2008 could have also played a role in the decreasing 
employment. As we can see from the graphs above both non-EU and low-skilled employment 
started falling in 2008 reflecting the overall bad economic situation across Europe and in France.  
 
                                                 
253 Huddleston et.al, “Integration Policies: Who Benefits?” MIPEX Policy Brief, 2015. 
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3.3.3 Germany DE 
 Similar to Austria, Germany has a long history of immigration, yet for most of history it 
refused to accept its status as a migration country. Germany was also part of the Gastarbeiter 
program in the 1960s254 , but it did not accept that many of the temporary workers stayed 
permanently in Germany constituting its first large foreign population. Since then, Germany has 
been accepting a growing number of immigrants and asylum seekers. However, only in 2005, did 
Germany  
“develop(ed) integration policies as well as a welcoming culture for immigrants and foster(ed) 
diversity systematically”. 255  Germany is one of the few countries with improving attitudes 
towards immigrants. 83% think that Germany is a welcoming country and 72% believe that 
German and non-EU citizens should have equal rights.256 
 In 2007, Germany followed a series of reforms in its policies to comply with EU 
directives.257 In addition to these reforms, Chancellor Merkel announced the introduction of a 
National Integration Plan258 and approved a 750 million worth of funding for integration. The 
policy promoted open dialogue on integration, the strengthening of migrant organizations, and 
better education and job opportunities for immigrants and those with a migrant background. For 
the period of 2007–2014, Germany is ranking 1st out of 17 EU-countries as an immigrant 
destination and 4th out of 17 EU-countries for its labor market immigrant integration policies. 
 Germany makes slow but steady progress on providing both equal access and great 
support to immigrants. Germany has taken the lead in Europe to facilitate and support the 
                                                 
254 Kraler & Jandl, “Austria: A Country of Immigration?” Migration Policy Institute, 2003, p.100. 
255 Bendel, “Coordinating Immigrant Integration in Germany: Mainstreaming at the Federal and Local Levels” 
Migration Policy Institute Europe, 2014, 1. 
256 Huddleston et.al, “Integration Policies: Who Benefits?” MIPEX, 2015. 
257 Leise, “Germany Strives to Integrate Immigrants with New Policies,” Migration Policy Institute, 2007. 
258 Nationaler Integrationsplan: Erster Fortschrittsbericht, 2008, 9-13. 
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recognition of foreign qualifications and skills, with its 2012 Recognition Act. Also, it is one of a 
few EU counties that has a wider range of targeted support. Overall, Germany takes time to build 
consensus; it pilots and then evaluates its new policies leading to effective outcomes. 259 
Importantly, Germany has had the right political, economic, and social conditions to do so. 
Germany’s integration policies have benefited and arguably contributed to its rising employment 
rates (see graphs above) and positive attitudes towards immigrants.  
 We can see from the graphs above that MIPEXL policies have a strong positive 
correlation with the employment of the total labor force. This result is in alignment with the ideal 
results from labor market integration policies positively affecting the employment of the total 
labor force. As I have analyzed above, Germany’s steps towards a successful labor market 
integration policy has been very effective playing a key role in the rising employment rates. We 
can also see that there is a positive correlation between non-EU labor force and MIPELX. Equal 
access to employment, great general and targeted support, and the recognition of migrants’ skills 
and qualifications are the factors that could have affected this strong positive correlation.  
  
 
 
                                                 
259 Huddleston et.al, “Integration Policies: Who Benefits?” MIPEX, 2015. 
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3.3.4 Netherlands NL 
 The Netherlands has been a country with a great history of migration, with 11.5% of its 
population being born abroad most from medium-to-low developed non-EU countries.260 The 
Netherlands created its first integration policy in the 1980s being a great advocate of 
multicultural integration policies. However, since then its approach has drastically changed. In 
2004, the Netherlands rejected multiculturalism261. Since 2004, civic integration and the creation 
of a Dutch identity, which meant adherence with societal and cultural norms, have become the 
basis for immigrant integration. After the collapse of 2010 right-wing government there has been 
increasing support for the far-right, which is associated with negative immigrant rhetoric.  
 The far-right has continuously politicized the integration policy, pressuring the 
government for restrictions. For the period of 2007–2014, the Netherlands is ranking 9th out of 
17 EU-countries as an immigrant destination and 3rd out of 17 EU-countries for its labor market 
immigrant integration policies. However, from 2010-2014, the Netherlands abandoned its 
commitment to equal opportunities for immigrants dropping -8 points on MIPEX,262 more than 
any other country has from 2007-2014. The Netherlands is taking a new approach to integration, 
which could be called a “policy to no policy” increasingly disinvesting in integration policies.263 
Overall, immigrants are expected to integrate, but there is no obligation to the institutions and 
integration policy makers to help in the process. This new approach has negatively affected the 
labor market. 
                                                 
260 Huddleston et. al, “Integration Policies: Who Benefits?” MIPEX, 2015. 
261 Joppke, “Beyond national models: Civic integration policies for immigrants in Western Europe”, Western 
European Policies, Vol. 30, 2007. 
262 Huddleston et. al, “Integration Policies: Who Benefits?” MIPEX, 2015. 
263 Ibid. 
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 Immigrant adults are demanded but not supported to learn the Dutch language and its 
core civic values. 264  They are expected to cover the expenses for themselves with ‘loans’ 
replacing the grants and free courses once provided. Immigrants are also expected to be 
employed, healthy, and civically active without the targeted support to overcome specific 
barriers they face.265 Without the targeted support, non-EU employment rates are increasingly 
falling. From 2010-2014, the Netherlands went from having one of the strongest targeted support 
to one of the weakest in Western Europe.266 Its targeted support score fell dramatically from 
80/100 in 2007 to 20/100 in 2014.  
 We can see from the graphs above that MIPEXL policies have a strong positive 
correlation with the employment of the total labor force. However, the positive correlation is 
caused as both employment and MIPEXL values are falling. As extensively analyzed, the 
Netherlands is increasingly disinvesting in immigrant integration and labor market migrant 
integration specifically. Its MIPEXL score dropped from 91 in 2010 to 73 in 2014. Interestingly, 
the NL total employment started falling before MIPEXL so disinvesting in immigrant integration 
policies could reflect Netherlands’ perception that with decreased overall employment, 
                                                 
264 Joppke, “Beyond national models: Civic integration policies for immigrants in Western Europe”, Western 
European Policies, Vol. 30, 2007, p.15. 
265 Ibid. 
266 Huddleston et. al, “Integration Policies: Who Benefits?” MIPEX, 2015. 
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immigrants are not welcomed. Disinvesting in MIPEXL could be used as a tool to incentive 
migrants to migrate elsewhere if they cannot be successfully employed.  
 We can also see that there is a positive correlation between non-EU employment and 
MIPEXL. This positive correlation could be explained by Netherlands’ absent targeted support 
not helping immigrants in the integration process. Interestingly, the correlation is smaller in 
comparison to total employment. This could be due to immigrants’ determination to integrate 
regardless of the support they are getting by institutions.  
 
3.3.5 Sweden SE 
 Sweden has been an immigration country since the 1950s with more than 15 percent267 of 
the population being foreign-born; of those approximately 13 percent are non-EU migrants268. 
The overall employment rate was very slightly affected by the economic crisis and is around 80 
percent; one of the highest employment rates in the developed world. The Swedish population 
has one of the most positive attitudes towards immigrants, similar to other Nordic countries, with 
80% of the population supporting that immigrants and natives should have equal rights269. In 
2009270, Sweden passed the Introduction Act and the Discrimination Act aiming to reach all 
those in need. For the period of 2007–2014, Sweden is ranking 10th out of 17 EU-countries as an 
immigrant destination and 1st out of 17 EU-countries for its labor market immigrant integration 
policies.  
 With the 2009 Labour Market Introduction Act, Sweden set new high standards for 
labour market integration aiming to strictly scrutinize any obstacles in laws or policies, offering 
                                                 
267 Eurostat, “Immigrants”, 2016. 
268 Eurostat, “Distribution of immigrants by citizenship”, 2016.  
269 European Social Survey, “Attitudes towards Immigration and their Antecedents: Topline Results from Round 7 
of the European Social Survey”, 2016. 
270 Government Offices of Sweden, “Swedish Integration Policy”, Ministry of Integration Offices in Sweden, 2009. 
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targeted support and mainstreaming its services to access a wider population in need. The Act 
aims to make it easier for newcomers to learn the Swedish language, find or create a job 
matching their skills. However, Sweden still needs to expand its access to procedures in order to 
recognize migrants’ skills and foreign qualifications and offer more Swedish language 
courses.271   
 According to Labour Force Surveys272, Sweden has the largest difference in employment 
rate between the Swedish born and foreign-born population in 18 out of 26 countries that the ad 
hoc-module was done in 2014. We can see from the graphs below that on average 50 percent of 
the non-EU labor force is employed compared to an average of 80 percent of the Swedish born. 
This is a very striking difference. 
 Overall, MIPEXL policies have a small negative correlation with the overall employment 
of the population in Sweden. Looking at the employment of non-EU workers this negative 
correlation sharply increases. We can see from the graphs that the score of MIPEXL policies 
increased in 2009, following the 2009 Labour Market Introduction Act that was implemented. 
However, the employment started falling in 2008, which was when the economic crisis hit. Thus, 
the fall of the employment rate could be caused by the economic crisis. However, even if the 
                                                 
271 Huddleston et. al, “Integration Policies: Who Benefits?” MIPEX, 2015. 
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initial fall was caused by the economic crisis, we would expect that the labour market integration 
policies would positively affect non-EU employment leading to an increase in the non-EU 
employment rate. The employment rate of the non-EU labor force started increasing, only 
slightly, in 2011. Nevertheless, the employment rate between the Swedish nationals and TCNs is 
still striking. We could argue that even if Sweden has a lot of policies in place they might be too 
new, small-scale or general to affect outcomes at the national level.  
 
3.3.6 United Kingdom UK 
 The United Kingdom has been an immigration country since the 1950s with around 10 
percent273 of the population being foreign-born; of those approximately 13 percent are non-EU 
migrants274. The UK along with the Netherlands were the countries that were perceived as the 
prototypes of the “multiculturalist” integration approach275. In 1948, with the independence of 
several of its colonies, the UK decided to grant all of its citizens in the Commonwealth countries 
the right to work, settle and vote (Nationality Act).276 Many immigrants from the territories of 
the former empire – Africa, Caribbean, Asia, and India – migrated to the UK and were perceived 
with a wave of racism. The UK responded with the Race Relations Act, which could be seen as 
its first migrant integration policy. UK’s immigration integration approach taken at this time 
could be exemplified by Roy Jenkins, the then Home Secretary; “I … define integration not like 
the levelling process of assimilation but as equal opportunities, associated with cultural diversity, 
in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance” (1967).277  
                                                 
273 Eurostat, “Immigrants”, 2016. 
274 Eurostat, “Distribution of immigrants by citizenship”, 2016.  
275 Joppke, “Beyond national models: Civic integration policies for immigrants in Western Europe”, Western 
European Policies, Vol. 30, 2007, p.8. 
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 However, starting in the 2000s a more secular approach was followed.278 The Nationality, 
Immigration, and Asylum Act of 2002 put forward the symbolic strengthening of national 
identity. After the Act, people seeking nationality had to take a citizens’ test claiming their 
knowledge of the English language, the institutions, the history, and law of Britain. A decade 
later, the UK started to sharply disinvest in immigrant integration policies. For the period of 
2007–2014, the UK is ranking 2nd out of 17 EU-countries as an immigrant destination and 11th 
out of 17 EU-countries for its labor market immigrant integration policies. 
 UK’s integration policies dropped 6 points, the 2nd largest drop following the 
Netherlands. Specifically, for the labour market integration policies, the UK is further 
eliminating its weak targeted measures for labour market integration at a time when most EU-
countries in Northern Europe are increasing their support. Regardless from its 2010 Equality Act, 
UK’s commitment to equality has decreased with 55% budget cuts for the Equality and Human 
Rights Commission and an end to the mandatory equality impact assessments.279 Overall, these 
restrictions could be seen as being part of the government’s plan to reduce migration and pursue 
a more nationalist approach. 
 The UK has good access to jobs, mainstream services and procedures to recognize 
foreign qualifications and skills but expects immigrants to pursue jobs and training without 
targeted support. Non-EU citizens in the UK are more likely than elsewhere in Europe to take up 
education and training.280 However, in the UK, unemployed non-EU citizens are much less likely 
to receive unemployment benefits to help them find a job 281 . A big number of non-EU 
individuals are working in jobs at the level of their qualifications. Thus, in the UK there is not a 
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279 Ibid. 
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big skill-job mismatch. Importantly, the UK’s labour market leaves behind a large number of 
low-educated UK and non-EU born.  
 UK’s labour market clearly reflects the strengths and weaknesses of its current context. 
The UK increasingly attracts global talent in competition with other English-speaking countries. 
These employment outcomes are influenced by the flexible & growing number of the labour 
force that is created with many coming to work and study in the UK and others coming with 
university degrees and English skills.  
  
 For the overall labour force, MIPEXL policies are negatively correlated with the total 
employment. This means that even if the UK has been disinvesting in the MIPEXL policies thus 
the MIPEXL score is falling, total employment has been increasing regardless. This could be due 
to the fact that UK’s labor market has been steadily increasing. At the same time, MIPEXL 
policies and the non-EU labour force are positively correlated. Thus, with less migrant 
integration efforts, the employment of the non-EU labour force has been falling. This could be 
caused as the lack of general and targeted policies negative affects the non-EU labor force. 
Interestingly, this could be the aim of the UK. With less immigrants being in employment it 
could be an incentive for them to leave the UK and migrate elsewhere. 
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3.4 Conclusion 
 As already stated, there has been limited economic research examining how the 
integration of migrants will specifically affect the wages and employment of native workers. In 
this econometric section, I attempted to look at the effect of labor market integration policies on 
the employment of the total, non-EU, low-skilled, young, old and female labour force in 
seventeen EU-countries. From my panel data analysis, I found that labor market immigrant 
integration policies positively affect the employment of the total population. A result I was 
expecting to find since I am arguing that the successful integration of migrants will 
complementary respond to the labour market increasing the overall output and thus better the 
employment of the total labour force. 
 In the random-effects-model regression analysis, MIPEXL is a determinant with 
statistical significance for the total employment of the seventeen EU-country labor force causing 
on average an 8.72% positive change. Disaggregating the total employment in different groups, 
MIPEXL positively affects all the disaggregations of employment. However, for the non-EU, 
low, and young labor force the effects of the MIPEXL policies are not statistically significant. 
Looking at the correlation coefficients of the 17 EU-countries and specifically analyzing the 
correlation coefficients of Austria, France, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, and the UK Ι get 
very mixed results.  
 An overall conclusion is that the EU does not have a comprehensive integration strategy 
and nor do a lot of the EU countries. Traditional migration countries and most Western European 
countries are increasingly investing in more effective general and targeted support programs. 
Since 2008, Germany has taken important steps towards targeted programs and it was also the 
first country, in 2012, to facilitate and support the recognition of foreign qualifications and skills. 
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Recognizing qualifications acquired abroad, along with targeted support measures, is really 
important to promote immigrant integration in the labour market and make full use of 
immigrants’ skills. Nevertheless, countries like the Netherlands and the UK who had been 
pioneers in the immigrant integration policies are increasingly disinvesting in their immigrant 
integration policies. Thus, there is not a clear direction of the EU immigrant integration strategy 
as a whole or the labour market immigrant integration policy specifically, which could be a very 
important determinant of our mixed results. From my analysis, immigrant integration policies 
seem to positively affect the employment of the total population and I would expect the impact to 
be even more positive, if immigrant integration policies were more cohesive. 
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Concluding Remarks 
 Immigration has been a heated topic with equally loud and influential proponents and 
critics. There has been an extensive academic literature around the effects of migration on the 
labour market. At the same time, there have been political debates about whether to allow 
immigration and how many immigrants states should accept. More recently, there have been 
increasing political debates about what to do with the immigrants already within states. Europe 
has increasingly been challenged to integrate not only EU-nationals but also third-country 
nationals; a reality that has modified the initial understanding of what integration meant. The 
European Union has been aiming towards a collective response to migration and immigrant 
integration with respect to immigrants’ rights. However, member states still perceive migration 
and immigrant integration policies to be at the heart of national sovereignty.  
 Member states have been enacting different policies and laws not necessarily following 
EU’s aim towards a collective EU response to migration and immigrant integration.  
Nevertheless, labour market immigrant integration has been at the center of immigrant 
integration policies. Positively, traditional migration countries and most Western European 
countries are increasingly investing in more effective immigrant integration policies.  
Nevertheless, countries like the Netherlands and the UK who had been pioneers in the immigrant 
integration policies are increasingly disinvesting in their immigrant integration policies. These 
different approaches are linked to the academic debates around the merits of multiculturalism or 
assimilation.  
 Outside of initial reports commissioned by the European Union, there has been limited 
quantitative analysis on the effectiveness of immigrant integration policies and more specifically 
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on the effectiveness of labour market immigrant integration policies. Even fewer intellectuals, 
have sought to compare these hypotheses against qualitative case studies. This has been the goal 
of this Senior Project.  
 I examined the effect of labour market immigrant integration policies, as defined by the 
Migrant Integration Policy Index, on the total employment rate and on the employment rate of 
different subgroups for seventeen EU countries. Then I took a deeper look at the relationship 
between employment and labor market immigrant integration for six different countries – 
Austria, France, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, UK –; countries that have been at the center of 
the immigrant integration debate.  
 From my analysis, immigrant integration policies seem to positively affect the 
employment of the total population and I would expect the impact to be even more positive, if 
immigrant integration policies were more cohesive. The results of my analysis showed the need 
to measure outcomes separately from policy as well as the need for more nuanced literature on 
the subject. Most importantly, the analysis showed the importance of targeted support measures 
and the recognition of qualifications acquired abroad as central factors to promote immigrant 
integration in the labour market and make full use of immigrants’ skills. 
The individual country analysis allowed us to further explore these conclusions:  
 Germany and Austria were countries with no immigrant integration policies before. 
However, they have created immigrant integration policies and have increasingly invested in 
targeted support programs, which have resulted in positive labour market outcomes. France, a 
prototype of assimilationist integration policies, where the integration of immigrants has been 
one of the worst in the EU, has negative results in the labour market.  Sweden is a very 
  
95 
interesting case, where its integration policies are the best of all in the EU, but this does not 
translate in positive labour market outcomes. 50 percent of the non-EU labor force are not 
employed compared to an average of 80 percent of the Swedish born. Sweden is a country that 
stresses the need to examine results separately from policy, as policies in place are not enough to 
lead to positive results. Finally, Netherlands and the UK, countries perceived as prototypes of the 
“multiculturalist” integration approach, have increasingly been disinvesting in their integration 
policies reflected in negative labour market outcomes. This could be linked to a negative 
sentiment towards immigrants, where countries are trying to incentivize immigrants to move 
elsewhere making it harder for them to be incorporated in the labour market. Overall, labour 
market immigrant integration policies do seem to have a positive impact on the labor market. 
However, the connection between policies and outcomes is not that straightforward thus a closer 
look at individual country cases is of outmost importance.  
Further Questions 
 There are many questions around immigrant integration yet to be answered and issues 
that must be addressed. One critical issue is the limited data available across all EU counties. 
This could be seen as even Eurostat is missing employment data for some EU countries and 
MIPEX lacks integration data for all the countries in the EU. Additionally, there is not a 
subgroup for the employment rate of the EU population for each EU country making it not 
possible to quantify the impact of labour market immigrant integration policies on the native 
population of each EU country. Better statistics could pave the way for more and better 
indicators but also for more accurate outcome indices.  
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 The most natural extension of this Senior Project would be the inclusion of additional and 
more accurate indicators for additional years. Including more and better-kept indicators and 
statistics would give us a clearer picture of what immigrant integration entails and its impact 
across the EU. Additionally, the incorporation of more years could show which countries are 
consistently stronger in immigrant integration policies and how their rankings have changed 
along with policy changes. Last but not least, it could lead to a better ability to indicate the 
impact of economic recessions on immigrant integration. 
 The results call for our attention to the importance of institutions on immigrant 
integration. Both my qualitative and quantitative analysis suggest that there is a positive 
connection between institutions and immigrant integration. However, the immigrant integration 
literature around this issue is limited. Thus, further studies could examine immigrant integration 
through a historic institutional perspective.  
 Last but not least, this Senior Project brings into question the relationship between 
policies and outcomes. As observed in the quantitative analysis, there is a discrepancy between 
the employment rate and the immigrant integration policies. Namely, based on my regression 
analysis, immigrant integration policies have a considerable positive impact on the total, old, and 
female employment rate, but do not have the same significance for the non-EU, low-skilled, and 
young labor force subgroups. Looking at specific EU countries my results are also mixed. These 
results were not well explained by the stated hypothesis that immigrant integration policies will 
lead to positive labour market outcomes as measured by the employment rate. This leads to a 
very important question: Do immigrant integration policies actually have a significant impact on 
immigrant integration outcomes?  
  
97 
  
  
98 
Bibliography 
1. Alba & Nee, “Rethinking Assimilation Theory for a New Era of Immigration,” International 
Migration Review 31 no. 4, 1997. 
2. Algan et al., “Cultural Integration of Immigrants in Europe”, Oxford University Press, 2012. 
3. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, 1983. 
4. Barnard & Scott, “The Law of the Single European Market: Unpacking the Premises”, Hart 
Publishing, 2002. 
5. Bendel, “Coordinating Immigrant Integration in Germany: Mainstreaming at the Federal and 
Local Levels” Migration Policy Institute Europe, 2014. 
6. Bilgili et al. “The Dynamics between Integration Policies and Outcomes: a Synthesis of the 
Literature”, 2015. 
7. Billiet, Meuleman, & Witte, “The Relationship Between Ethnic Threat and Economic Insecurity 
in Times of Economic Crisis: Analysis of European Social Survey Data”, Migration Studies, 
2014. 
8. Borjas, “Economic Theory and International Migration”, The International Migration Review, 
Vol. 23, 1989.  
9. Borjas, “The Labour Demand Curve Is Downward Sloping: Reexamining the Impact of 
Immigration on the Labour Market”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2003. 
10. Borjas, “The Wage Impact of the Marielitos: A Reappraisal” ILR Review, 2015. 
11. Brubaker, “Marcel Mauss on Nationhood: Objectivism and Its Limits”, Studies on Nationalism, 
2004. 
12. Burns, “Cameron Criticizes ‘Multiculturalism’ in Britain,” The New York Times, 2011. 
  
99 
13. Card, “The Impact of the Mariel Boatlift on the Miami Labor Market”, Industrial and Labor 
Relations Review, Vol. 43, No.2, 1990. 
14. Carrera, “Benchmarking Integration in the EU: Analyzing the debate on integration indicators 
and moving it forward”, BertelsmannStiftung, 2008. 
15. Choquet, “Models of Integration in Europe” Fondation Robert Schuman, 2017. 
16. Clemens & Hunt, “The Labor Market Effects of Refugee Waves: Reconciling Conflicting 
Results”, IZA Institute of Labor Economics, 2017. 
17. Clemens, “There’s no evidence that immigrants hurt any American workers”, Vox, 2017. 
18. Council Directive 2003/86/EC on the right to family reunification, 2003. 
19. Council Directive 2003/109/EC concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-
term residents, 2003. 
20. Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA, on combating certain forms and expressions of 
racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law, 2008. 
21. Council of the European Union, “The Stockholm Programme – An open and secure Europe 
serving and protecting the citizens”, 2009. 
22. Council of Europe, “Explanatory Memorandum of the draft Recommendation CM/Rec(2011)13 
of the Committee of Ministers to member states on mobility, migration and access to health 
care”, 2011. 
23. D’Amuri & Peri, “Immigration and Occupations in Europe”, CReAM Discussion Paper No. 
1026, 2010. 
24. Declaration of the European Ministerial Conference on Integration, ZARAGOZA, 2010. 
25. Desilva, “Panel Data Methods” 
 
  
100 
26. Eichhorst et al., “The Integration of Migrants and its Effects on the Labour Market”, IZA 
Research Report No. 40, 2011. 
27. Entzinger & Biezeveld, “Benchmarking in Immigrant Integration”, European Research Centre on 
Migration and Ethnic Relations, 2003. 
28. Eurofound – European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions 
https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/about-clip  
29. European Commission, “Action Plan of the Integration of Third Country Nationals”, 2016. 
30. European Commission “An Economic Take on the Refugee Crisis” Directorate-General for 
Economic and Financial Affairs, 2016. 
31. European Commission, “A new impetus for European cooperation in Vocational Education and Training to support 
the Europe 2020 strategy”, 2010. 
32. European Commission, “Annual Report on Migration and Integration”, 1st Report; 2004. 
33. European Commission, “Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy in the EU”, 
2004.  
34. European Commission, “European Fund for The Integration of Third-Country Nationals 2007-
2013”, Directorate-General Justice, Freedom & Security, 2007. 
35. European Commission, “The European Agenda for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals”, 
2011.  
36. European Commission, “European Web Site on Integration: Migrant Integration Information and 
Good Practices”, https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/home. 
37. European Commission, “Europe 2020, Integrated guidelines for the economic and employment 
policies of the Members”, 2010. 
38. European Commission, “Europe 2020 strategy: A strategy for smart, sustainable, and inclusive 
growth”, 2010. 
  
101 
39. European Commission, “Handbook on Integration for policy-makers and practitioners”, 1st 
Edition; 2004, 2nd Edition; 2007, 3rd Edition; 2010. 
40. European Commission, “Youth Strategy 2010-2018”, 2009. 
41. European Commission, “Migration and Home Affairs, Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund 
(AMIF)”, 2014. 
42. European Commission, “Study on educational support for newly arrived migrant children”, 
2013. 
43. European Migration Network (EMN) https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-
do/networks/european_migration_network_en. 
44. European Parliament, “Trends In The Eu-27 Regarding Participation Of Third-Country Nationals 
In The Host Country's Political Life” Area of Freedom, Security, & Justice, 2007. 
45. European Social Survey, “Attitudes towards Immigration and their Antecedents: Topline Results 
from Round 7 of the European Social Survey”, 2016. 
46. European Standard Eurobarometer Survey 83, 2015. 
47. European Union, “Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union”, 2012. 
48. European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, http://fra.europa.eu/en 
49. Eurostat, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/lfs/data/database. 
50. Eurostat, “Distribution of immigrants by citizenship”, 2016. 
51. Eurostat, “Immigrants”, 2016. 
52. Foged & Peri, “Immigrants’ effect on native workers: new analysis on longitudinal data”, 
Institute for the Study of Labour, 2015. 
  
102 
53. Geddes & Hadj-Adbou, “An unstable equilibrium: freedom of movement and the welfare state in 
the European Union”, Handbook on Migration and Social Policy edt. By Freeman & Mirilovic, 
Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016.  
54. Glazer, “We are all Multiculturalists Now” Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1997. 
55. Gordon, "Assimilation in America: Theory and Reality." The MIT Press on behalf of American 
Academy of Arts & Sciences 90.2,1961. 
56. Government Offices of Sweden, “Swedish Integration Policy”, Ministry of Integration Offices in 
Sweden, 2009. 
57. Groenendijk, “Integration Policy and Community Law”, The Nexus between Immigration, 
Integration and Citizenship in the EU, 2006. 
58. Halikiopoulou & Vlandas, “The Rise of The Far Right in Debtor and Creditor European 
Countries: The Case of European Parliament Elections”, The Political Quarterly, 2015. 
59. Holmes & Castaneda, “Representing “the European refugee crisis” in Germany and beyond: 
Deservingness and difference, life and death” Journal of the American Ethnological Society, 
2016. 
60. Holmes & Seth “Fresh Fruit, Broken Bodies: Migrant Farmworkers in the United States” 
Berkley: University California Press, 2013. 
61. Holmes & Seth “Structural Vulnerability and Hierarchies of Ethnicity and Citizenship on the 
Farm” Medical Anthropology, 2011. 
62. Huddleston et.al,“Integration Policies: Who Benefits? – Policy Brief”, MIPEX, 2015. 
63. ILO, Trade Union Density Rate (%),  
  
103 
64. http://www.ilo.org/ilostat/faces/oracle/webcenter/portalapp/pagehierarchy/Page27.jspx?indicator
=ILR_TUMT_NOC_RT&subject=IR&datasetCode=A&collectionCode=IR&_adf.ctrl-
state=8d7wcc62g_4&_afrLoop=1748931627899516#! 
65. IOM, “Fostering Health Provision for Migrants, the Roma, and other Vulnerable Groups”, 2015. 
66. IOM, “World Migration Report 2015”, 2015. 
67. Joppke, “Beyond national models: Civic integration policies for immigrants in Western Europe”, 
Western European Policies, Vol. 30, 2007. 
68. Joppke & Morawska, “Toward Assimilation and Citizenship: Immigrants in Liberal Nation-
States” Migration, Minorities, and Citizenship, 2003. 
69. Kerr, “U.S. high-skilled immigration, innovation, and entrepreneurship: empirical approaches 
and evidence”, World Intellectual Property Organization, 2013. 
70. Kraler & Jandl, “Austria: A Country of Immigration?”, Migration Policy Institute, 2003.  
71. Kraler & Reichel, “Measuring and Monitoring Immigrant Integration in Europe: Integration 
Policies and Monitoring Efforts in 17 European Countries”, The Netherlands Institute for Social 
Research, 2012. 
72. Kymlicka, “Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights”, Oxford University 
Press, 1995. 
73. Labour Force Surveys, “Labour Situation of migrants and their immediate descendants 2014”, 
2016. 
74. Legifrance, LAW n ° 2004-228 of March 15, 2004. 
75. Leise, “Germany Strives to Integrate Immigrants with New Policies,” Migration Policy Institute, 
2007. 
76. Lodovici, “Making a success of integrating immigrants in the labour market”, 2010. 
  
104 
77. Mauss presented by Fournier and Terrier “La nation”, Paris Presses Universitaires de France, 
2013. 
78. Migrant Integration Policy Index 2015, http://www.mipex.eu/ 
79. Moodod, “Multiculturalism, citizenship and national identity”, Open Democracy, 2007. 
80. Munz, “Old Europe: A Look Ahead to the Twenty-First Century”, Institute for Human Sciences, 
2007. 
81. Mulcahy, “Europe’s Migrant Policies: Illusions of Integration”, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, p. 
32. 
82. Nationaler Integrationsplan: Erster Fortschrittsbericht, 2008, 9-13. 
83. OECD, European Commission, “Matching Economic Migration with Labour Market Needs”, 
2014. 
84. OECD, ILO, World Bank. “The Contributions of Labor Mobility to Economic Growth.” Joint 
paper for G20 Labour and Employment Ministers’ Meeting, 2015. 
85. OECD, “International Migration Outlook 2008”, 2008. 
86. OECD, “International Migration Outlook 2011”, 2011. 
87. OECD, “International Migration Outlook 2013”, 2013. 
88. OECD, “International Migration Outlook 2016”, 2016. 
89. OECD, “Indicators of Immigrant Integration 2015”, 2015. 
90. OECD, “Naturalization: A Passport for the Better Integration of Immigrants?”, 2011. 
91. OECD, Value Added by Activity, https://data.oecd.org/natincome/value-added-by-activity.htm 
92. OHCHR, “The Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of Migrants in An Irregular Situation”, 
2014 
  
105 
93. Ortega and Peri, “The causes and effects of international labor mobility: evidence from OECD 
countries 1980-2005”, United Nations Development Programme Human Development Research, 
2009. 
94. Ottaviano & Peri, “Rethinking the Effect of Immigration on Wages”, Journal of the European 
Economic Association, 2012. 
95. Papademetriou, “Fostering an Inclusive Identity Where It Matters Most: At the Local Level” 
Migration Policy Institute, 2014. 
96. Peri, “Do immigrant workers depress the wages of native workers?”, IZA World of Labor, 2014. 
97. Peri & Sparber, “Task Specialization, Immigration, and Wages”, American Economic Journal: 
Applied Economics, 2009. 
98. Peri & Yasenov, “The Labor Effects of the Refuge Wave: Synthetic Control Method meets the 
Mariel Boatlift”, IZA Institute of Labor Economics, 2017. 
99. Portes & Borocz, “Contemporary Immigration: Theoretical Perspectives on Its Determinants and 
Modes of Incorporation”, International Migration Review 23, no.3, 1989. 
100. Puente et al., “Towards an assessment of migration, development and human rights links: 
conceptual framework and new strategic indicators”, Peoples’ Global Action on Migration, 
Development, and Human Rights, IV Global Forum, 2010. 
101. Ruhs, “Theorizing labor immigration policies: openness, skills and rights”, Handbook on 
Migration and Social Policy edt. By Freeman & Mirilovic, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016. 
102. Simeone, Taran & Gächter, “‘Situation-Testing’: Discrimination in Access to Employment based 
on ILO Methodology”, International Migration Programme, 2010. 
103. Soysal, “Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Members in Europe”, The University 
of Chicago Press Books, 1997. 
  
106 
104. Squire, “The Exclusionary Politics of Asylum” Basignstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. 
105. Tampere European Council 15 And 16 October 1999. 
106. UNDP, “Overcoming barriers: Human mobility and development” Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. 
United Nations, “International Migration Report 2015: Highlights”, Department of Economic & 
Social Affairs, Population Division, 2016. 
107. United Nations, “Replacement Migration: Is It a Solution to Declining and Ageing Populations?” 
Population Division, Economic and Social Affairs, 2000. 
108. United Nations, “Transforming our World: 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development”, 2015. 
109. Walzer, “On Toleration” Yale University Press, 1997. 
110. Weaver, “Angela Merkel: German Multiculturalism Has ‘Utterly Failed,’” The Guardian, 2010. 
111. World Bank, Employment in services, female (% of female employment) 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.SRV.EMPL.FE.ZS?end=2014&locations=EU&start=20
07&view=chart 
112. World Bank, GDP growth (annual %), 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG 
113. World Bank, Inflation - consumer prices (annual %), 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG 
114. World Bank, “Migration and Development: A Role for the World Bank Group”, 2016. 
115. World Bank, Trade (% of GDP), https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS 
Zaslove, “Exclusion, Community, and a Populist Political Economy: The Radical Right as an 
Anti- Globalization Movement,” Comparative European Politics 6, no. 2 
